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ABSTRACT 
This research project has its origin and motivation in work done by Lysaker, 
Johannesen and Lysaker (2005), which explored the experience of being as a person 
with schizophrenia in relation to other individuals.  The researchers examined the nature 
of the schizophrenic experience from within the framework of the dialogical model of self, 
and presented schizophrenic intersubjectivity as a potentially horrifying and 
disintegrating experience.  Lysaker et al (2005) discuss the notion that the individual self 
unfolds as a composite structure of multiple selves, existing in dialogical interaction with 
one another.  Their research aimed to show that the individual with schizophrenia 
experiences difficulty tolerating this dialogue on an intrapsychic level.  Because 
interpersonal exchange requires that individuals adopt a variety of self-other modes of 
relatedness, suggest Lysaker et al, interpersonal engagement for the person with 
schizophrenia is disclosed as profoundly threatening (ibid.) 
Moving from the above-mentioned research, this project aims through a 
hermeneutic phenomenological process to clarify and narrate the subtleties of the 
intersubjective experience, as that experience is disclosed in the lived world of a person 
with schizophrenia.  How does such an individual experience self in relation to other?  
How does such an individual negotiate their sense of self in terms of their dialogicality?  
The phenomenological hermeneutic method, as shaped by such theorists as Gadamer 
(1976), Heidegger (1962) and Buber (1970), will emerge as the interpretive platform 
upon which these questions are approached.   
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“The environment is that moving wave, which envelopes us from all sides and 
determines our milieu without which we could not live.  Events emerge from it like little 
islands and touch the most intimate aspects of our person.  The person reverberates like 
a taut string in unison with them; he penetrates the environment, and reacts with it in a 
personal way.” 
- Bin Kimura, “The phenomenology of the between” 
 
 
“Who are you?”  
The caterpillar to Alice 
“I – I hardly know, Sir, just at present – at least I know who I was when I got up this 
morning, but I think I must have changed several times since then.” 
Alice, in response to his question 
 
 
“Man wishes to be confirmed, and wishes to have a presence in the being of the other. 
… Sent forth from the natural domain of species into the hazard of the solitary category, 
surrounded by the air of a chaos which came into being with him, secretly and bashfully 
he watches for a Yes which allows him to be and which can come to him only from one 
human person to another.  It is from one man to another that the heavenly bread of self-
being is passed.”  
- Martin Buber, “On intersubjectivity and cultural creativity”  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The inspiration for this work was drawn from research by Lysaker and Lysaker 
(2001, 2002, 2005) which explored the experience of schizophrenic intersubjectivity1
It has been observed that one of the defining characteristics of individuals 
suffering from a schizophrenic illness is the degree of impoverishment in interpersonal 
relationships (APA, 2000; Kaplan & Sadock, 2003).  The schizophrenic experience has 
been described as characterised by a pervasive impoverishment in familial, social and 
occupational relationships.  This difficulty in engaging in social relationships is given 
primary concern in social science research insofar as it has been noted as being a risk 
factor related to relapse and suicide (Goldberg, 2003).   
 in 
relation to the dialogical model of self and self-world relatedness.  Although not 
specifically related, this research project does have intellectual and thematic origins in 
research which I conducted previously, which focused on the impact of diagnostic 
labelling, firstly on diagnosed individuals’ experience of freedom, and secondly on their 
intersubjective experience (Bradfield, 2002; Knight & Bradfield, 2003).  The significant 
difference between this former work and the current project lies in the fact that the earlier 
work was more specifically antipsychiatric in its agenda.  Further to this, participants in 
the previous research had been diagnosed with a variety of mental illnesses including 
mood, personality, and psychotic disorders.  
Phenomenological investigations into schizophrenia have narrated a “basic 
relational deficit” (Rulf, 2003), which is described as an existential orientation towards 
being-in-the-world in the mode of isolation and difference.  Blankenburg (1980), whose 
work emerged at the forefront of phenomenological inquiries into schizophrenia, 
                                                 
1 Henceforth the term “schizophrenic intersubjectivity” will be used to denote the intersubjective 
experience of individuals with schizophrenia. 
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described being-with-schizophrenia in terms of an essential loss of natural common 
sense.  By this Blankenburg intended to describe a mode of being-in-the-world defined 
by a difficulty in understanding disclosed phenomena, and a sense of newness, in which 
the world appears to the individual with schizophrenia as a place un-encountered and 
unfamiliar.  This translates to the experience of interpersonal relationships, in which the 
individual with schizophrenia is said to find intersubjective co-existence confusing and 
disarming (ibid.).   
In relation to this, Parnas, Jansen, Sass and Handest (1998) denote the central 
feature of schizophrenic intersubjectivity as being a sense of disengagement and self-
alienation, which they claim is based not only on a sense of detachment from the other, 
but more crucially on a loss of contact with self.  This is disclosed phenomenologically, 
suggest Parnas et al (1998), as a sense of being cut off from ones own experience as a 
being-in-the-world.  In this sense it is suggested that schizophrenic intersubjectivity, as 
defined by disconnection from other, is coupled intrapsychically with the experience of 
being disconnected from ones own experience of self.  In this research can be seen the 
formative influence of Laing’s (1965) foundational work into the schizophrenic 
experience.  Laing proposes schizophrenia as a state of ontological insecurity, which 
emerges existentially as a fragmentation of certainty with respect to the essential traits of 
self and world.  Laing’s ontological insecurity unfolds in three ways, that is, engulfment, 
implosion or petrification.   
Engulfment is disclosed in schizophrenic intersubjectivity through the person with 
schizophrenia becoming overwhelmed-in-relation to the other.  Engulfment emerges 
through the individual’s experiencing a sense of immanent threat to the continuity of their 
identity.  In this sense, when in a relationship with an other, the individual with 
schizophrenia fears profoundly the possibility of fusion with the other, and complete loss 
of self (Laing, 1965).  Engulfment is thus grasped as the threat posed to the self through 
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that self’s relatedness to an other.  This notion shall be explored further in relation to the 
exploration of schizophrenic intersubjectivity from within the dialogical model of self.  For 
Laing the ontologically insecure person is also threatened with petrification (Laing 1965, 
1970).  Petrification for Laing unfolds in the experience of the person with schizophrenia 
as a threat of becoming solidified into a unitary, hardened and immobile self.  The 
petrified self experiences itself, intrasychically and interpersonally, as a dead weight, 
unable to imagine or enact itself with any sense of variety and spontaneity.  In this sense 
the petrified self loses its variousness and its subjectivity.  This notion will emerge once 
again as central to the exploration of schizophrenia from the dialogical model of self.    
Japanese phenomenologist Bin Kimura proposes the notion of intersubjectivity 
as central to any phenomenologically informed inquiry into the schizophrenic experience 
(Kimura, 1982, 1984).  Kimura posited schizophrenia as a fundamental disturbance of 
the situational betweenness that is intersubjective co-existence.  For Kimura, self 
emerges as an identity which must establish itself in relation to constant fluctuations in 
space and time.  Self, in its engagement with the world, must always return to itself 
reflectively, needing to maintain its sense of its identity, its sense of being an “I”.  It is 
precisely this finding of the continuous “I” in relation to an ever-fluctuating self-world 
relatedness, Kimura maintains, which threatens the person with schizophrenia.  Defined 
broadly by Kimura as a pathology of intersubjectivity, schizophrenia is posited as a 
relational dysfunction of self in relation to self and in relation to other.  Kierkegaard cited 
this pathology, and described the affliction of schizophrenic intersubjectivity as a 
disruption of the self’s relation to itself as a relational existent (Kierkegaard 1980/1849, in 
Lysaker, 2005).   
The notion of an intrapsychic self-self relationship will unfold in this work as 
foundational.  Intersubjectivity, as grasped herein, unfolds both as a relationship 
between and within the individual.  The dialogical model of self will be presented as a 
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way of conceptualising and narrating this intrapsychic relatedness.  It shall be presented 
briefly here, and more completely in the review of literature.  The dialogical theory of self 
emerges from an intellectual history beginning with the writings of Mikhail Bakhtin, 
whose interpretations of Dostoyevsky’s work was the origin of dialogism (Bakhtin, 1981).  
In his analysis, Bakhtin makes the assertion that human beings are best understood as 
“polyphonic” beings; as a process of an intrapsychic dialogue between distinct “voices”, 
which are understood as the various aspects of self.  Bakhtin defined these voices as 
“functionally independent elements within persons” (In Lysaker et al, 2005).  In 
developing an understanding of Bakhtin’s work, I shall rely on the works of Hermans and 
Kempen, who emerge at the forefront of dialogical theory (Hermans & Kempen, 1993; 
Hermans, 2002).  Hermans et al define the self as a multiplicity of I positions, and 
maintain that the self, as dialogical, is able to move between various aspects of itself, in 
relation to a fluctuating spatio-temporal context.    
“The I fluctuates among different and even opposed positions, and has the 
capacity imaginatively to endow each position with a voice so that dialogical 
relations between positions can be established.  The voices function like 
interacting characters in a story, involved in a process of question and answer, 
agreement and disagreement.  … As different voices these characters exchange 
information about their respective Me’s, resulting in a complex, narratively 
structured self.” (Hermans, 2002, p. 148) 
This description articulates lucidly the image of self within dialogical theory as a 
composite of different self-positions, or different modes of being-in-the-world.  Lysaker et 
al (2005) concretise the notion of self-positions by offering ways in which self can 
express itself variously, for example, self-as-brother, self-as-lover, self-as-student, self-
as-creative, or self-as-anxious.  In relation to the proposal of an internal dialogue as 
central to the self’s experience of itself, Hermans et al (1993) suggest that this dialogue 
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is made possible by the hierarchical organisation of the various self-positions.  In this 
sense dialogical theory proposes the existence at one point in time of a dominant self-
position, which, when the individual moves into a different relational context, will retreat, 
and be replaced by a previously non-dominant self-position.  This theory will be fleshed 
out more completely in the review of the literature.  It is necessary to give it mention in 
the introduction insofar as the theory emerges in this project as central to the 
hermeneutic fore-structure.    
It is now necessary to move away from the prime focus of this research, and 
touch briefly on the significance of an exploration into intersubjectivity.  The notion of the 
intrapsychic as a self-contained, private, discrete and unified existent has pervaded 
psychological thinking.  A growing body of literature in psychotherapeutic, psychiatric 
and sociological practice is challenging this notion, in an attempt to relocate the “I” as a 
purely relational being-in-the-world.  Habermas (1981, 1988) articulated his conviction 
that to exist as an “I” is simultaneously to exist as an I-in-relation-to-a-You.  He 
expressed a phenomenology of self, in which being is bound experientially to being-with.  
Martin Buber’s exploration of relatedness developed an “ontology of the between”, in 
which beings-in-the-world find themselves always in an interhuman space, and realise 
their being in the interpersonal dialogue which that space implies (Buber, 1970; 
Friedman, 1988).  In relation to this, it is the aim of this work to inquire into the nature of 
the intersubjective experience of one person with schizophrenia.  The primary goal of 
this research will be to examine how the individual with schizophrenia experiences their 
self in relation to others, in a full variety of relational contexts.2
                                                 
2 Such contexts could include, amongst others, professional, familial, sexual, platonic and culturally based 
relationships. 
  How is schizophrenic 
intersubjectivity disclosed phenomenologically in the lived experience of the individual 
with the disorder?  To answer these questions a phenomenological hermeneutic 
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methodology will be employed in an attempt to narrate a descriptively close 
understanding of being-with in the world of the individual with schizophrenia.   
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
This exposition of the relevant literature will focus on clarifying firstly the essence 
of phenomenological ontology as a mode of engagement between researcher and 
narrative, which is grounded in a tradition of philosophical thought.  It is necessary to 
elucidate phenomenological ontology so as to enable an understanding of the 
exploratory origins of this work.  I shall then proceed with an exploration of the concept 
of intersubjectivity in psychotherapeutic, sociological and psychiatric thought.   Various 
understandings of intersubjectivity will be presented in an effort to outline the importance 
of this concept in research into the human experience. 
Following this, the schizophrenic experience will be explored, with specific 
reference to phenomenological inquiries into the nature of that experience.  An overview 
of phenomenologically informed contributions to schizophrenia research will be 
presented, with the intention of revealing the validity of such explorations into the 
psychiatric domain.  The notion of the dialogical self will emerge out of this exploration, 
and will be presented as a theory of self which narrates interpersonal and intrapsychic 
dialogue, and thereby implies the concept of an internal intersubjectivity.  The theory of 
the dialogical self will be presented in relation to the intellectual history from which it 
emerged.  Finally, a description of inquiries into the dialogical self and the schizophrenic 
experience will be presented.   
 
PART 1 
2.1.1  On the nature of phenomenological inquiry:  Glancing towards the 
immanent  
This description of the phenomenological psychological agenda is intended as an 
attempt to clarify the foundational issues upon which phenomenological thought rests.  
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Fundamental to phenomenological philosophy is its internal diversity as a school of 
thought.  Embraced as a practice rather than a system (Moran, 2000), phenomenology 
emerges as an anti-traditional style of philosophising, aimed at the disclosure of a 
phenomenon through description, as that phenomenon appears in human 
consciousness.  In service of this aspiration, pure phenomenology’s aim is to bypass all 
presupposition which may impact on the human scientist’s coming-to-know the lived 
world of the experiencing individual (ibid.).  Phenomenology emerges as a philosophy 
aimed towards the revelation of human experience through a description of that 
experience that is grounded in being-in-the-world.  The notion of being-in-the-world 
comes from a more specifically Heideggerian phenomenological discourse, and relates 
to the location of individual experience out there, beyond the self, and in immediate 
relation with the world (Heidegger, 1962).  As a delving-into the lived world of the 
individual, phenomenology unfolds as focused on narrating the lebenswelt (McCall, 
1983).  For Heidegger the lebenswelt is understood as the immediate disclosure of the 
world of phenomena as apprehended by consciousness.  Essential to Heidegger’s 
conceptualisation of the lebenswelt is its definition as the disclosure of phenomena prior 
to conscious reflection.  In this sense the lebenswelt is the world as immanently and pre-
reflectively known by the experiencing individual (McCall, 1983).   
Edmund Husserl shaped phenomenology as a project aimed towards uncovering 
the individual lived world through the mode of essential intuition.  For Husserl essential 
intuition unfolds as a gazing-into the phenomenon of lived experience, aiming towards 
describing the individual’s apprehension of that phenomenon (Husserl, 1931).  
Fundamental to Husserl’s pure phenomenology was the notion of the phenomenological 
reduction.  For Husserl this reduction was defined by a suspension of belief in the 
natural attitude as the source of informative veracity (ibid.).  This reduction, known as the 
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eidetic reduction, emerged as a suspension of belief in all knowledges which could 
influence the scientist’s knowing of the individual.   
Phenomenology has developed historically in a variety of distinct forms, each 
with its own creative agenda.  Emmanuel Levinas imagined the phenomenological 
reduction far less fundamentally, as a movement beyond the horizons of individual 
preoccupation. In this he encouraged in the researcher a motion towards engaging in a 
space external to self, directed towards inhabiting the horizons of the experiencing 
individual whose world is being described  (Moran, 2000).  Jean-Paul Sartre realised his 
existential phenomenological reduction differently.  For Sartre the reduction was 
articulated as a way of coming to know the truth of an affective and imaginative world not 
through objectivist investigation, but rather through articulating the ways in which 
emotional states are immediately and pre-reflectively lived (Sartre, 1943, 1957).  Martin 
Heidegger appropriated Husserl’s reduction in his focus on negating the impact of all 
philosophies on the researcher’s seeing of the individual.  Heidegger aimed to cultivate a 
“pure naïvete” (Cited in Moran, 2000).  Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology 
focused on articulating Dasein, or Being-There, which he described as the individual’s 
situatedness in the lebenswelt.  Dasein was conceived as the individual’s “thrownness” 
in an immediately lived and concretely apprehended world (Dreyfus, 1991).  For 
Heidegger, Dasein was grasped as an immediate situatedness, which is simultaneously 
disclosed in the world as a future-oriented, motional existent.  Heidegger’s approach to 
coming to know Dasein echoes Husserl’s eidetic reduction, but envisages that reduction 
less fundamentally.  Heidegger’s prime focus was to come to know of the experience of 
being-in-the-world as that experience is felt concretely in a lived world. 
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2.1.2  A departure from pure phenomenology: Gadamer and the languaging of 
being  
I would now like to proceed with an exploration of the re-directed 
phenomenological agenda that came with the introduction of phenomenological 
hermeneutics.  The philosophical hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer will emerge as 
the ontological and methodological grounding of this work.  Gadamer’s hermeneutics 
grew out of a phenomenological tradition beginning with Heidegger’s ontology.  
Gadamer’s phenomenology moved away from the phenomenological reduction as an 
essential component of the process of delving-into the lebenswelt.  For Gadamer 
language emerged as the medium of coming to understand human experience 
(Gadamer, 1976, 1989).  As such, the linguistic horizons of both researcher and 
participant play a crucial role in the process of generating understanding.  Through this 
integration of the researcher’s horizons Gadamer’s hermeneutic saw the return of the 
role of the researcher’s system of knowledges to the motion towards understanding.  
Gadamer’s project aimed towards “essence illumination”, which he articulated as the 
making manifest of the “matters themselves”.  For Gadamer, the essential matters of 
“things themselves”, that is, the phenomena as they are experienced in the lived world, 
are only revealed through language (Moran, 2000).  Further to this, meaning for 
Gadamer is disclosed only through dialogue between individuals, whose knowledges are 
incorporated through their languaging or their experience (Gadamer, 1989). It can be 
seen quite clearly how this hermeneutic ontology differs from the eidetic reduction of 
pure phenomenology.  Gadamer’s phenomenology revolves around the process of 
understanding through the act of mutual human engagement.  It will be seen in the 
exposition of intersubjectivity how this philosophical agenda contributes to the subject of 
exploration.   
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Gadamer’s ontology places language at the helm.  For Gadamer language 
instantiates being.  In this, being-in-the-world comes into being through the act of 
languaging the lived world (Weinsheimer, 1985).  Following Heidegger, Gadamer views 
language as the medium through which the life of a culture as well as the life of an 
individual is given expression.  Language embodies and shapes existence, and creates 
the inhabited world (Moran, 2000).  Central to the place of language in Gadamer’s 
method is the notion that language can never be a neutral act.  Language is in its 
essence traditionary, and conveys in its descriptions a vast system of cultural and 
educational knowledges and expressive assumptions which voice the individual’s being-
in-the-world (Moran, 2000).  Gadamer’s ontology gives the traditionary quality of 
language prime significance both in terms of the individual’s voicing of their experience, 
as well as the researcher’s narrative of that experience.  The tradition embedded in the 
individual’s languaging of experience was articulated by Gadamer as similar to 
Heidegger’s notion of the thrownness of our being-in-the-world.  In this sense language 
expresses a tradition that embodies the situatedness of an individual within his or her 
world of lived experience.  Language manifests historicity, which is the incorporation of 
our past being-in-the-world with our current situatedness.  This notion is essential to the 
epistemological foundation on which this project is laid, and must be born in mind when 
reading the outline of the methodology.   
 
PART 2 
In this section I intend to outline of the emergence of intersubjectivity in social 
science research.  The theoretical contributions of psychoanalytic and phenomenological 
inquiries into the subject will be explored.  This will be followed by a description of a 
sociological perspective, focusing mainly on the work of Martin Buber, and showing how 
this perspective echoes phenomenologically informed notions of intersubjectivity.  A brief 
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account of intersubjectivity as it has emerged in psychiatric practice will then be 
provided, with specific reference to the work of Harry Stack Sullivan and R. D. Laing. 
2.2.1  Perspectives on intersubjectivity: Psychoanalytical and phenomenological 
contributions  
In the analytic space the notion of intersubjectivity has emerged from the 
dominance of the intrapsychic as relational psychoanalytic movements have come to the 
fore.  The intention of relational theories has been to conceptualise the effects of human 
relationships on development, as seen in connection with internal and intrapsychic 
mechanisms (Benjamin, 1999).  Historically, intersubjectivity found entry into 
psychoanalysis through philosophy, and unfolded as a statement of the notion that the 
analytic process must be understood as occurring between rather than within individuals.  
Stolorow and Atwood aimed to generate an understanding of the emergence of the 
intrapsychic within the “larger interactional system” within which it is disclosed (Stolorow, 
1994, p. 3).   
In terms of the emergence of intersubjectivity theory in psychoanalytic practice, it 
can be seen how this notion was moulded by a variety of theorists.  Kohut for example 
spoke of the self-selfobject relationship, whilst Mitchell articulated the relational matrix, 
and Stolorow and Atwood spoke of the intersubjective context (Stolorow, 1994).  In 
these conceptualisations was recognised an understanding of the intrapsychic as 
experientially and developmentally bound to the interpersonal.  Emotional and 
psychological life is grasped as constituted by and mediated within the intersubjective 
surround.  Interestingly, Stolorow and Atwood (1994) describe their psychoanalytic 
orientation as phenomenologically geared.  These theorists identify in the relational 
context of psychoanalysis a hermeneutic phenomenological discourse.  I refer the reader 
to section 2 of chapter 3, in which Hans-Georg Gadamer’s hermeneutic phenomenology 
is explicated.  In hermeneutics we see the interpretation of the life-text of an individual.  
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In this interpretation, the hermeneuticist enters the process through an essential fusion 
of their horizon of experience with the horizon of the individual whose being-in-the-world 
is storied through the text.  Hermeneutics is therefore envisioned as a dialogue between 
interpreter, or analyst, and narrator, or analysand.     
The articulation of intersubjectivity in psychoanalytic theory and practice emerged 
as a response to what the relational theorist’s termed the “myth of the isolated mind” 
(Stolorow & Atwood, 1992, p. 9).  The authors suggest that the notion of mind as a 
separate entity, as expounded in classical psychoanalytical movements, implies a 
segregation of being from being-in-the-world.  In this sense it is suggested that the 
isolated mind implies an alienation of individual being from the social context in which 
that being is disclosed.  The authors note the primacy of intersubjective experience, and 
suggest that “the intrinsic embeddedness of self-experience in intersubjective fields 
means that our self-esteem, our sense of personal identity, even our experience of 
ourselves as having a distinct and enduring existence are contingent on sustaining 
relations to the human surround.” (ibid, p. 10).  Natterson and Friedman (1995) put this 
even more forcefully: 
“Intersubjectivity entails reciprocal causal relationships of all parts of the human 
universe with all other parts.  All human events are co-created by the 
participants.  Everyone changes, and is changed by, everyone else.” (Natterson 
& Friedman, 1995, p. xiii) 
Significant to relational psychoanalysts’ articulation of intersubjectivity within the 
analytic space is the notion of an interactive field, an essential space-between, which 
has been described variously by different theorists (Schwartz-Salant, 1995).  The 
interactive space between analyst and analysand, known variously as the transitional or 
potential space (Winnicott), the analytic object (Greene), the intersubjective field 
(Stolorow & Atwood) and the analytic third (Ogden) is described essentially as the place 
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of intersection between two mutually engaging subjectivities (cited in Schwartz-Salant, 
1995).  Relational theorists came to focus on this space of reciprocal intersubjective 
engagement, turning this point of contact into the focus of the therapeutic endeavour.  
This emergence of intersubjectivity within the therapeutic space can be understood in 
relation to Scheff’s (1973) definition of intersubjectivity as a full recognition of the 
emotional tone existing within and between self and other.  Although more specifically 
phenomenologically narrated, Merleau-Ponty identified the notion of the intersubjective 
space in his work on the phenomenology of perception: 
“In the experience of dialogue, there is constituted between the other person and 
myself a common ground; my thoughts and his are interwoven into a single 
fabric, my words and those of my interlocutor are called forth by the state of the 
discussion, and they are inserted into a shared operation of which neither of us is 
the creator.” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 354) 
 I would now like to proceed with a brief exposition of phenomenology’s 
articulation of the intersubjective realm, commenting the contributions of Ludwig 
Binswanger.  Natterson and Friedman (1995) identify intersubjectivity as an important 
aspect of phenomenological philosophy and psychology.  Roger Frie (1997) explored 
intersubjectivity in his psychoanalytically oriented inquiry into the works of Sartre, 
Binswanger, Lacan and Habermas.  In Frie’s exploration of the role of language in the 
constitution of subjectivity and intersubjectivity, he proposed intersubjective relatedness 
as the condition through which selfhood can emerge.  Reminiscent of Gadamer’s 
phenomenological ontology, Frie suggests that subjectivity is structured through 
reciprocal dialogue between interacting beings.  In this sense it is proposed that subject 
(self) and object (world) are co-constituted through the mutual engagement that is being 
in the world (Luijpen, 1969).  Sartre too spoke of the “mutual gaze”, a concept used to 
imply the co-constitution of self and world through the meeting and dialogue of self and 
 15 
other (Sartre, 1943; Angus, Osborne & Koziey, 1991).  Spinelli (1989) proposed an 
intersubjective conception of self in which he recognised that self emerges through 
sustained discourse with other beings-in-the-world, and that the individual’s awareness 
of self comes about as a result of these interactions.   
Central to phenomenological accounts of intersubjectivity is the work of 
existential psychoanalyst Ludwig Binswanger, who considers mutuality, or being-with, as 
fundamental to understandings of human existence (Koehler, 2004).  Binswanger’s 
definitions of intersubjectivity in relation to the experience of mental disorder contributed 
to the philosophical fuelling of the anti-psychiatry movement (Lanzoni, 1995).  His 
therapeutic system sees a combination of Heidegger’s thought with Martin Buber’s 
dialogical philosophy, which shall be explicated further on in this chapter (Frie, 2000).  
Binswanger asserts the primacy of the intersubjective in his statement that subjectivity 
and intersubjectivity are ontologically coeval (Frie, 1997).  Binswanger echoes the 
relational psychoanalysts in his proposition that development occurs in relation to 
dialogue with others in a shared world, and this dialogue is grasped as linguistic in 
essence. 
“The human being is only “human” in speaking-with-one-another, in the 
communication of I and Thou as we, on the basis of a shared linguistic world or 
… a shared linguistic world-design.  Language is not a mere medium of 
exchange, but a being-with-one-another in a world that makes understanding 
possible.” (Cited in Frie, 1997, p. 134)  
It will be seen in the account of phenomenological hermeneutics in the 
methodology chapter, how Binswanger’s proposition feeds directly into the ontological 
and methodological assumptions of this specifically hermeneutic phenomenological 
work.   
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Binswanger’s phenomenological ontology unfolded out of the Heideggerian 
tradition, and this can seen in the way in which he enlarged certain Heideggerian 
concepts in his therapeutic system.  Binswanger identified three modes of being-in-the-
world, which he declared exist simultaneously.  These are the umwelt, which constitutes 
the environment in which an individual exists, the eigenwelt, which is the private, and 
specifically intrapsychic element of being-in-the-world, and the mitwelt, which is the 
world of social relations (Frie, 2000).  The mitwelt is disclosed thematically as the with-
world, and Binswanger articulates this mode of being as a space in which the individual 
and the social unfold in existential union.  Binswanger argued that it is essential for all 
investigations into psychopathology that we attempt to form an understanding of the way 
in which the individual structures their existence in line with these three modes of being.  
And it is on this point that Binswanger’s therapeutic enters the realm of explorations in 
psychopathology.  Binswanger insisted that person and world exist relationally as one.  
In respect of this notion, Binswanger’s phenomenological agenda can be seen as an 
intent to question and come to understand being-human through exploring the totality of 
existence, which includes our relations with others.   
As noted, Binswanger’s phenomenology was influenced by the work of Buber 
and Heidegger.  As such his thesis moved towards a philosophy of dialogue, the chief 
proponent of which was Buber.  It is now necessary to proceed with a brief articulation of 
Buber’s dialogical theory, showing how this philosophy contributed significantly to the 
emergence of subjectivity as central to psychoanalytic work as well as research in the 
social sciences.   
2.2.2  The “I-Thou” in clinical intersubjectivity  
The philosophy of Martin Buber is pivotal in this theoretical explication of 
intersubjectivity, and unfolds as having contributed significantly to philosophical, 
sociological and psychological theorising on the subject.  Buber’s “ontology of the 
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between” (Friedman, 1999) echoes the notion of intersubjectivity as vital to the creation 
of self.  Buber suggests that reciprocal relatedness with the other promotes the 
development of aspects of self, which development would be disenabled were the 
individual to exist in isolation.  Buber’s is a philosophy of dialogue, in which self is 
grasped as interacting both with itself, in an intrapsychic relatedness, as well as 
interacting in dialogical relation with other beings-in-the-world (Friedman, 1999).    
Buber’s philosophy can again be seen in direct contradistinction to the notion of 
the separate and contained identity.  He responded contrarily to the conceptualisation of 
individual identity as a “skin-encapsulated ego” (Goldberg, 2000), suggesting that the 
notion of the self-contained and private subjective self is fallacious (Knight & Bradfield, 
2003).  Buber asserts the primacy of intersubjectivity, and suggests that being-in-the-
world is contingent upon the individual’s entry into a reciprocal dialogue with their world, 
which Buber calls the I-Thou (Buber, 1937/1970).  The I-Thou is a relational mode of 
being which enables the coming-into-being of the individual.  In Buber’s words: “I require 
a Thou to become; becoming I, I say Thou” (cited in Goldberg, 2000).  For Buber, the I-
Thou is the primary relationship (Goldberg, 2000), and entering the I-Thou allows for the 
full revelation of the being of the self.    
George Herbert Mead, a contemporary of Buber’s, characterised the self within a 
lived social world as “an eddy in the social current” and spoke of the process of 
development of self as a dialogue between the self and the self’s image of being-human, 
as informed by that self’s engagement in a social world (Mead, 1934, cited in Friedman, 
1999).  In this sense the revelation of self is seen in direct relation to the individual’s 
grasping of the being-in-the-world of another self, whose existence-in-dialogue with the 
self enables the unfolding of self.   
Buber’s focus on subjectivity as bound to the interhuman unfolds primarily as a 
statement about the importance of communication.  He suggests that human life, as a 
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shared existence, comes into being through meetings between self and other (Buber, 
1957, 1992).  Central to Buber’s articulation of the interhuman is the notion that the self 
requires confirmation of itself by the other.   
 “Man wishes to be confirmed, and wishes to have a presence in the being of the 
other. … Sent forth from the natural domain of species into the hazard of the 
solitary category, surrounded by the air of a chaos which came into being with 
him, secretly and bashfully he watches for a Yes which allows him to be and 
which can come to him only from one human person to another.  It is from one 
man to another that the heavenly bread of self-being is passed.” (Buber, 1992, p. 
5) 
Necessarily forgiving Mr. Buber for his sexist discourse, it can be seen in this passage 
how he cites the emergence of self as related to the self’s finding its existence confirmed 
in a shared and reciprocal interhuman space.   
In Buber’s dialogical philosophy it is essential to the development of self that the 
self, apart from being confirmed by the other through dialogue, is initially set apart from 
the other in the mode of independence and distance-in-relation.  In this sense, in order 
to emerge as a self in a relational context, it is important to first be established as an 
other (Friedman, 1988).  For Buber, in order for the individual to recognise themselves 
as a self in relation to an other, it is necessary to become aware of themselves in terms 
of their opposition to the other.  This, for Buber, is what allows for the mutual and coeval 
making-present of one individual self in relation to another (Buber, 1937/1970).  In his 
more strictly psychoanalytic theorising on the subject, Binswanger is seen to echo this 
notion in his suggestion that reciprocity in the interhuman space is necessarily 
characterised by a dialogue between separateness and relatedness (Koehler, 2004).  
This expression of Buber’s ontology of the between was presented as a foundational 
philosophy upon which my understanding of intersubjectivity was based. 
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2.2.3  The place of the interpersonal in psychiatry 
It is now necessary to conclude this exploration of intersubjectivity with an 
account of psychiatric notions of the intersubjective.  The work of Harry Stack Sullivan 
(1962, 1964) and Karen Horney is cited as having contributed significantly to exploring 
the interpersonal in psychiatry (Kruger, 1988).  For Sullivan psychiatry was purely the 
study of the interpersonal (Nill & Halling, in Valle & Halling, 1989).  Sullivan envisioned 
personality as emerging through interpersonal contact, and identified the exchange of 
emotional tone between mother and infant as the formative relational context in the 
development of subjectivity through intersubjectivity.  This exchange of emotional tone, 
which is a reciprocal process, was what Sullivan called empathy.  For Sullivan empathy 
emerged as the essential component of the between.  Empathy was grasped by Sullivan 
as that point of intersection defined diversely as the self-selfobject relationship or the 
relational matrix.   
Apart from Sullivan’s work, explorations of intersubjectivity entered psychiatry 
through the work of the anti-psychiatrists, most notably R. D. Laing, whose psychiatric 
orientation was distinctly phenomenological (Laing, 1961, 1965, 1970).  Laing wanted to 
describe psychopathological process as contextually bound in being-in-the-world (Potter, 
2006).  Laing’s efforts were focused on an attempt to articulate psychopathology in a 
manner which revealed the intelligibility of behaviour defined within psychiatry as folly 
(Ingleby, 2005).  Considerations of intersubjectivity entered Laing’s work primarily 
through his notion of the complimentary identity (Laing, 1961).  For Laing, the self 
requires the presence of an other, with whom that self can enter into dialogical 
engagement, in order for the self to emerge as a self.  In this sense, suggested Laing, 
self-identity can only be actualised in relationship.  Importantly in terms of the focus in 
this project on the self as dialogical, we can see traces of dialogicality in Laing’s thinking.  
He suggested that the very fact of the self as constituted through interactions with an 
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other implies that the self is not continuous, but always fluctuating-in-relation (ibid.).  
Through this we see the emergence in Laing’s interpersonal psychiatry of a multiply 
constituted and multiply disclosed self-identity, which could be shaped by contradictory 
and ambivalent versions of self.   
The interpersonal enters Laing’s account of the genesis of psychopathology, 
rendering his theory of pathological process intersubjective in its origin.  Laing’s thinking 
was impacted upon by Buber in his adoption of Buber’s notion of confirmation by the 
other as essential to the emergence of self.  Laing viewed confirmation by the other as a 
facilitative human experience (Laing, 1961).  For Laing, as for Buber, the self cries out 
for confirmation.  Following from this, Laing viewed disconfirmation as a destructive 
event, which enabled the genesis of psychosis.  Specifically articulated in his research 
into schizophrenia and the family, Laing described disconfirmation as central to the 
emergence of schizophrenia through the family system (Laing & Esterson, 1970).   
The work of R. D. Laing plays an important role in the understandings generated 
in this work, and will be fleshed out to a greater extent in the account of 
phenomenological explorations into schizophrenia, which is to follow.  
 
PART 3 
This section of the review of the literature will explore phenomenological 
contributions to understanding and describing the schizophrenic experience.  A variety of 
perspectives will be focused on, with the aim of articulating understandings of 
schizophrenia informed by its disclosure in a shared world.  I shall firstly present an 
outline of the place of phenomenological and hermeneutic phenomenological research in 
inquiries into schizophrenia.  A phenomenologically informed account of schizophrenia 
from an intersubjective frame will then be provided, articulating the disclosure of 
schizophrenia as an affliction of the between.  The works of Ludwig Binswanger (1963), 
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Wolgang Blankenburg (1980), Bin Kimura (1982, 1984), and Larry Davidson (1992, 
1994) will be noted as having contributed particularly to the validity of phenomenology as 
a mode of inquiry applicable to research into the schizophrenic experience.  The 
nuances of the schizophrenic experience will then be explored further in Part 4 of the 
review of the literature, which will provide an account of the dialogical model of self.     
2.3.1  Phenomenological and hermeneutic phenomenological narratives on 
schizophrenic process 
Phenomenological interpretation has entered schizophrenia research through the 
works of a wide variety of authors.  Davidson (1992, 1994) envisioned the 
phenomenological agenda within schizophrenia research as being focused on narrating 
the lebenswelt of the individual with schizophrenia in a manner which reveals the 
intelligibility of that experience.  The phenomenological experience, suggest Corin and 
Lauzon (1994) is one of being situated in a given life-world relatedness from which 
being-in-the-world is inseparable.  It is the work of the phenomenologist to describe the 
individual’s mode of response and engagement with that life-world situatedness.  
Phenomenological psychiatry, in relation to this agenda, is aimed towards describing the 
nuance of experience, as characteristic of a psychiatric disorder.  The project of 
phenomenological psychiatry is to narrate mentally ill individuals’ projections of 
themselves on to their lived world, as that projection is constituted particularly through 
their being-mentally-ill (ibid.).  In relation to this then, it can be seen how the 
phenomenological method, in its approach to schizophrenia, aims to narrate the 
individual’s being-there, in the Heideggerian sense of the dasein, and his or her being-
with, in the sense of the mitsein.   
Importantly, the phenomenological approach moves away from exploring the 
schizophrenic experience as an isolated and encapsulated one, and projects itself 
instead towards evaluating that experience as lived and intervolved within being-in-the-
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world (Kimura, 1984).  This notion will be explored further in the consideration of 
phenomenological psychiatry’s focus on intersubjectivity within schizophrenia research.   
Kruger (1988), following Binswanger, asserts the primacy, within 
phenomenological psychiatry’s focus on the individual’s world-relatedness, of examining 
the betweenness which shapes and substantiates human experience.   
“A radical phenomenology would see what is called psychopathology, e.g. 
schizophrenia, not as a sickness that somehow attacks a person, but rather as a 
state of being in which the person starts relating to the world and fellow men in 
ways that are not readily comprehensible.” (Kruger, 1988, p. 170) 
In this statement we see the phenomenological assertion that psychopathological 
process is disclosed primarily in the interhuman space, and in the intersection between 
person and world.   
Basic to phenomenological exploration is the notion of returning to “the things 
themselves”, that is, to return to and describe the emergence of phenomena as 
experienced in the lived world.  Blankenburg (1980), quoting Binswanger, suggests that 
the aim of phenomenological psychiatry is to “’retrieve man’ out of the models, 
constructs, theories, and habits of thought of classical psycho(patho)logy and of various 
psychoanalytic, behaviouristic, sociological approaches.” (Blankenburg, 1980, p. 52).  
Corin and Lauzon (1994) structure this motion towards eliciting the things themselves in 
a hermeneutically oriented phenomenology.  For these authors the process of eliciting 
the lived world unfolds as a hermeneutic back-and-forth motion, in which the objective 
facts of the individual’s lived world, that is, their facticity, are seen in relation to the 
individual’s subjective experience of those facts.  The circular movement from a focus on 
facticity to a focus on experience as located within that facticity shapes, for Corin and 
Lauzon (1994), the nature of hermeneutic phenomenological inquiry into the 
schizophrenic experience.   
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As noted, this work is based on a hermeneutic phenomenological method.  As 
such, the focus herein will be on the revelation of experience from the text gleaned 
through the interview process.  The decision to adopt a more hermeneutic orientation 
was based on the notion that language is primary to the manifestation, characterisation 
and interpretation of mental illness.  Sullivan (1964) suggests that language emerges as 
an attempt by the individual to attain a sense of ontological security, in the Laingian 
sense.  In this respect, suggests Sullivan, the languaging of the individual with 
schizophrenia is seen as unable to generate that sense of security.   Blankenburg (1980) 
cites the primacy of language in terms of the function of language to indicate and solidify 
relationships between self and world.  As seen in Buber’s ontology, the languaging of 
being is at the same time the languaging of being-with.  In relation to this, the agenda of 
hermeneutic phenomenology within investigations into psychopathology is to identify 
language as a statement of a shared lived world, and to render intelligible the mentally ill 
individual’s languaging of their world.     
The focus on rendering intelligible the communications of people with 
schizophrenia is seen as having primary significance in terms of the importance of 
intelligibility as the foundations of each individual’s sense of their own being-in-the-world.  
Barham (1993) elucidates the importance of living out a shared and sharable narrative in 
terms of an individual’s sense of their possessing a history.  He suggests that the claim 
that an individual’s narrative, or life-text - as the phenomenological hermeneuticists 
would have it - is unintelligible, is a claim which robs that individual of the situatedness 
and the historicity which their narrative is trying to express (Barham, 1993).  In this 
sense phenomenological hermeneutics, in its application to schizophrenia research, can 
be seen as aiming towards salvaging the interpretability, intelligibility, and by extension, 
the world-relatedness of the mentally ill individual’s languaging of experience.  
Hermeneutic phenomenology intends, in its approach to psychopathology, to elicit the 
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historical and traditionary embeddedness of the individual’s narrative, as an expression 
of their being-in-the-world (Rulf, 2003).     
In terms of the place of phenomenology as contributing to schizophrenia 
research, Kimura (1982) suggests that phenomenology finds its route into psychiatry 
primarily through its apprehension of psychopathology as emerging in the “between”.  
For phenomenology, psychopathology is unequivocally communicated as a subjective-
intersubjective mode of being.  It is towards the disclosure of schizophrenia within the 
intersubjective space, as explored by phenomenology, that I now turn.   
2.3.2  Narrating the space between: Phenomenological interpretations of 
schizophrenic intersubjectivity 
“Human existence is intrinsically interpersonal.  Each of us is as well as lives out 
an unfolding network of relationships with others; each of us comes to know 
himself as an individual only in relation to others.  There is no “I” except in 
relation”. (Fischer, 1986, p. 71) 
In this statement we see the assertion of the primacy of the interpersonal as a 
constituting factor in the emergence of self.  The aim of this section is to explicate the 
role of the interpersonal in the disclosure of schizophrenia.  Pitfield (1991) proposes the 
notion of dialogical world-construction, through which she intends to imply the co-
creation of being-in-the-world through self’s encounter with world.  In her work Pitfield 
articulates a sociologically informed conception of illness as an intersubjective 
experience.  In light of this, we note Binswanger’s description of schizophrenia as a 
process of becoming estranged from intersubjectivity, and estranged from being-with, in 
which the establishment of relationships with others becomes a difficulty (Watanabe & 
Kato, 2004).  Van den Berg (1972) expressed the isolation that can come to shape 
psychopathological existence.  In this work Van den Berg (1972) gave a 
phenomenologically informed account of the incommunicability that is potentially at the 
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core of being-in-the-world as a mentally ill person.  Salmon (2004) describes an 
identified idiosyncrasy and impoverishment in the capacity of the individual with 
schizophrenia to engage reciprocally in the interpersonal realm.  Appealing to Laingian 
notions, Salmon cites the inhibition of the emergence of self, through a suffocating family 
system - the so-called schizophrenogenic family - as contributing significantly to the 
unfolding difficulties in schizophrenic intersubjectivity. 
A brief sketch of Laing’s conception of schizophrenia and the family is necessary, 
so as to locate his work as a landmark in current understandings.  Although Laing’s work 
emerged as fundamentalist in terms of his convictions regarding the role of the 
interpersonal in the genesis of mental illness, his work does point to foundational 
considerations in the contemplation of schizophrenia.  As the reader will recall, Laing’s 
conception of ontological insecurity was given mention in the introductory chapter (p. 2).  
The concepts of engulfment and petrification were presented briefly, and were described 
as positions of ontological insecurity.  For Laing, the unfolding of being in a state of 
ontological insecurity was related to parental disconfirmation of the developing child-self, 
resulting in a consequent inhibition of development, and a sense of self as fused with the 
parental object (Laing & Esterson, 1970).  In this sense ontological insecurity was 
connected with the individual’s being unable to develop a sense of self as separate and 
independent, and rather coming to experience self as fused with an inhibiting other.  This 
experience of fusion was seen by Laing as connected with the individual’s experiencing 
being-in-the-world as a state of being-threatened with their own non-existence, and 
hence the term ontological insecurity (Laing & Esterson, 1970).  Sullivan describes 
something similar to Laing’s ontological insecurity in his notion of the individual with 
schizophrenia as being terrified of the possibility of their own disintegration, a state 
which Sullivan calls nothingness (Frosch, 1983).  Although this kind of 
psychodynamically oriented conceptualisation of the schizophrenic experience is not the 
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aim of this project, it is important to note Laing’s theory as being foundational to critical 
psychiatry’s exploration of the interpersonal in understanding schizophrenia.   
Bin Kimura’s phenomenologically oriented work on the schizophrenic experience 
introduces an important consideration in terms of the individual’s interrelationship with 
their world with respect to time as a constituting factor.  Kimura (1984) explores the 
concept of the individual’s experience of self as fluctuating in relation to temporality.  
Kimura begins with the assumption that ones experience of selfhood is defined by a 
sense of “sameness”.  In this sense, in the individual’s relationship with their world they 
are aware of an identity which extends across a temporal motion from past into future3
“The concept ‘self’ has two different but inseparably interpenetrating aspects.  In 
the first instance it refers to sameness or identity …  Unharmed by never-ending 
inner and outer metamorphoses, I always remain the same I.  Yet this continuous 
identical self is not something which is a completed given from the outset.  
Instead, it is something which I repeatedly have to maintain through an ever-new 
act of relating-to-the-self from time to time.  Here the second aspect of being a 
self is announced: the ever to be repeated act of returning to the self which thus 
enables one becoming oneself.” (Kimura, 1984, p. 193)    
.  
With this awareness of identity, Kimura suggests, the individual is simultaneously aware 
of how they fluctuate in resonance with factors external to the self, which penetrate and 
alter the self.   
For Kimura, this process of returning to a continuous self across fluctuations in time and 
space is enabled through, and is what characterises, the “between”.  It is only through 
mutual encounter with an other that the self is able to establish itself as a self; that is, as 
                                                 
3 I refer the reader to the work of relational analyst, Frank Summers (1999), who provides a convincing 
exploration of the notion of self as multiple and continuous, and as shifting in configuration from one 
relational context to the next.  Summers debates the self as continuous versus self as discontinuous, giving 
this topic more attention than fits within the scope of this project.   
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not-the-other.  It is only through the self’s presentation of itself to the between that it can 
become aware of itself and its own identity.   
Kimura presents this consideration of temporality in relation to selfhood as a 
platform from which to propose his understanding of schizophrenia and intersubjectivity.  
The individual with schizophrenia, suggests Kimura (1984), experiences difficulty in 
perceiving within themselves this sense of trans-temporal sameness and continuity.  
Instead, being-in-relation-to-others, which is a fluctuating and unstable process, is 
experienced by the individual with schizophrenia as a possible antecedent to a feared 
disintegration of the self.  Davidson and Roe (2005) express this notion somewhat 
differently in their exploration of schizophrenia in terms of the self’s narrative of 
experience.  For these authors the difficulty experienced by the individual with 
schizophrenia is a trouble with constructing a coherent and commonsensical narrative of 
their life, due to a pervasive sense of disruption and discontinuity in their experience of 
self through time (ibid.) 
In Davidson and Roe’s proposition we can see reflections of Kimura’s notion of a 
difficulty, experienced by the individual with schizophrenia, in finding and experiencing 
an uninterrupted sense of selfhood and self-identity.  This notion will be explored further 
in relation to the inquiry into the dialogical self, which disputes the notion of a unitary and 
singular self.  For the moment it is important to acknowledge the proposition that the 
schizophrenic experience is constituted significantly by an experience of self as 
interrupted and discontinuous.  The implications of this notion will be explored in terms of 
schizophrenic intersubjectivity, which, it is maintained, contributes to the individual’s 
sense of a discontinuous and fragmented self.  It will be seen in Part 4 of the review of 
the literature that a variety of theorists have identified intersubjectivity as potentially 
threatening and even terrifying for the individual with schizophrenia.  This experience of 
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threat will be seen as related to a difficulty, for the person with schizophrenia, in 
sustaining a sense of selfhood and identity through encounter with the other.   
   
PART 4 
It is now necessary to describe the dialogical model of self, as this model partly 
constitutes the hermeneutic fore-structure of this research.  Firstly, the notion of 
dialogicality will be presented in terms of its intellectual origins.  This will be followed by 
a discussion of dialogicality in terms of its place in intersubjectivity theory.  This section 
will serve simultaneously as an articulation of phenomenologically informed conceptions 
of internal multiplicity.  Finally I shall present understandings derived from current 
research, relating to the notion of the dialogical self and the experience of schizophrenia.   
2.4.1  From Bakhtin to Hermans: Narrating the multivoicedness of the self  
The theory of the dialogical self envisages individual subjectivity as constituted 
variously by an ensemble of self-positions, each relating to both self and world in a 
different way.  The history of this notion can be traced in the work of Kierkegaard, who 
defined individual subjectivity as the self’s relation both to itself and to the world in which 
it exists (Lysaker, Johannesen & Lysaker, 2005).  For the purposes of this work, Mikhail 
Bakhtin’s interpretation of Dostoyevsky’s novels emerges as the origin of dialogical 
theory.  In his interpretations Bakhtin suggested that human subjectivity is “polyphonic”, 
and proposed a conception of consciousness as a dialogue between diverse aspects of 
self.  For Bakhtin the self is composed of multiple voices, each articulating a unique and 
independent perspective, and each contributing to the cultivation of a coherent narrative 
communicating the individual’s being-in-the-world (Barresi, 2002).   
Holquist (1990) identifies in Bakhtin’s work the notion of an intrapersonal 
simultaneity, in which the self as dialogical finds itself in a constant and multiply 
realisable exchange of aspects of itself.  Todorov (1984) envisaged Bakhtin’s dialogism 
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through his introduction of the notion of intertextuality.  For Todorov the dialogical self, 
as constituted by a multiplicity of voices, is further constituted by a variety of texts, which 
speak diversely of the individual’s being-in-the-world.  These texts exist in dialogical 
relation with one another, each text emerging in responsive exchange with other texts.  
In this sense we see the disclosure of a semantic relation between various aspects of 
self (ibid.)  
Hermans and Kempen (1993) and Hermans (2002) feature at the forefront of 
current thinking around the dialogical self.  Hermans, following Bakhtin, articulated the 
notion of self as a “heterogeneous society”, by which he intended to imply the disclosure 
in individual consciousness of a multiplicity of self-positions, emerging in dialogue with 
one another (Hermans, 2002).   
“Like a society, the self is involved in oppositions, agreements, disagreements, 
contradictions, negotiations and integrations.  Self and society both function as a 
polyphony of consonant and dissonant voices.” (Hermans, 2002, p. 148) 
In relation to his conception of self as heterogeneous society Hermans identifies 
similarities between the intrapersonal and interpersonal self, which he uses as a point 
from which to move into theorising about intersubjectivity.   
2.4.2  Exploring being-with: The disclosure of intra- and interpersonal relatedness 
through the dialogical self 
Central to Hermans’ (2002) argument is the notion that both self and society, 
being polyphonic and multiple, carry with them the opportunity for intersubjective 
exchange.  The dialogical self maintains an internal relationship in which the varying 
self-positions, or I-positions (Valsiner, 2002), interact in communication with one 
another.  Just as the self corresponds and communicates with other selves, so too does 
it engage with its own self on a relational level.  Valsiner (2002) describes the dialogical 
self as entailing two domains of selfhood.  The first, which he names heterodialogue, is 
 30 
the dialogical process existing between one self, the subject, and another self, the 
object.  For Valsiner the other self needn’t necessarily be a real existent. It could, for 
example, be a hallucinatory figure with which the self relates.  The second dialogical 
process is what Valsiner refers to as autodialogue, which is dialogue within oneself.  
Both hetero- and autodialogue are defined as intersubjective processes.   
Lysaker et al (2005) describe this internal dialogue as a process of moving 
between the various self-positions in relation to a fluctuating interpersonal and temporal 
context.  In Lysaker’s conceptualisation we can see reflections of Kimura’s expression of 
self as fluctuating in relation to temporality.  Lysaker in fact defines the self as the activity 
of moving between those divergent aspects which constitute our being-in-the-world.  
Spinelli (1989) articulates a phenomenological conception of this notion in his notion of 
the multiple self, which he describes as the disclosure of being as a series of diverse 
expressions of self.  This continual motion between the various self-position, suggests 
Lysaker, is instantiated through our being-in-relation-to-others.  This can be understood 
clearly if we consider the concept of the self-position.  It can be seen how each 
individual, in their correspondence with their world, is variously disclosed.  As indicated 
earlier, self can emerge in the following ways: self-as-brother, self-as-lover, self-as-
smoker, self-as-student, self-as-angry, self-as-musical, and so on.  It is suggested that a 
specific self-position is called forth in relation to the relational context in which individuals 
find themselves.  Luijpen (1969) noted this in his phenomenologically oriented assertion 
that “man makes man be” (p. 267).  In this sense, suggests Luijpen, the individual self 
emerges as a self in relation to a social context, which enables and even possibly 
specifies the disclosure of that self.  To suggest that a specific social context calls forth 
the emergence of a specific self-position is to identify the social character of individual 
subjectivity.  It is to suggest, as was suggested by the relational psychoanalysts 
mentioned above, that self emerges in and through its relation to other.  In this sense we 
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see the conceptualisation of psychological life as co-created through the process of self-
other engagement (Becker, 1992).   
Central to the notion of the dialogical self is the understanding of self as moving 
through a multiplicity of possible variations of itself (Hermans & Kempen, 1993; Haggard, 
2005).  For these authors, movement between self-positions unfolds in relation to a 
fluctuating intersubjective context.  As has been noted, it is fundamental to the 
disclosure of the dialogical self that the individual is able to construct a coherent 
narrative throughout the continual transition from one self-position to the next.  For 
Hermans and Kempen (1993) the construction of this narrative is made possible through 
the uncomplicated movement of diverse selves from the foreground of experience into 
the background.  That is to say, at any one point a particular aspect of self will emerge 
as dominant in relation to other aspects of self.  With a movement into a different 
relational context the previously dominant self-position will give way, allowing for the 
emergence into the foreground of a different self-position, which relates more specifically 
to the emerging interpersonal context.  The individual’s capacity to allow for and tolerate 
this shifting into different self-positions is what enables a continuous and coherent 
narrative of experience (ibid.).  As will be seen in the discussion of schizophrenia and 
the dialogical self, it has been suggested that the schizophrenic experience is partly 
characterised by an inability to tolerate ones own dialogicality within the intersubjective 
context, and a sense of threat as accompanying shifts from one self-position to another.   
2.4.3 (a)  The interrupted self: Schizophrenia and the threat of the multiple “I” 
This section will explore the notion that schizophrenic intersubjectivity is 
negatively impacted upon by the individual’s difficulty with tolerating intrapsychic 
movement between self-positions, which is necessitated by fluctuations in the relational 
context (Hermans & Kempen, 1993).  I refer the reader to the works of Lysaker, 
Johannesen and Lysaker (2005), and Lysaker and Lysaker (2001, 2002, 2005).  These 
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works emerge at the foreground of my understanding of schizophrenia and the dialogical 
self.   
Lysaker et al (2001) propose that the self is disclosed as an activity of dialogue 
between independently communicable and divergent aspects of self.  In this regard they 
describe the “multiplicity of voices” which is disclosed as narrating the life-text of the 
individual (ibid, p. 25).  These voices, or “self-positions”, are potentially dissonant in 
terms of their relation to one another.  In this sense the self emerges within the system 
as multiply definable, multiply communicable, and multiply relatable in terms of its 
intrapsychic and interpersonal engagement.  This multiplicity is furthermore constituted 
by synchronous and antithetical elements communicating within the union that is self.   
Central to Lysaker et al’s (2002) inquiries into the dialogical self is their 
proposition of internal dialogue as constituting the individual’s narrative of experience.  
The notion of sustaining a narrative of experience is understood by Lysaker et al as 
allowing for the sustenance of self-regard, that is, the continuous sense of experiencing 
oneself as an “I” through the flux that is the dialogical motion between self-positions.  
And thus we see the assertion of the “I” trans-temporally:  “I am angry”, “I am a chef”, “I 
am confused”, “I am a daughter”, “I am a student”.  But always, throughout these 
fluctuating interpersonal and intrapsychic contexts there remains the assertion of the 
continuous “I”.  For Lysaker and Lysaker (2005) the assertion of the “I” is a dialogical 
and historical assertion; that is to say, it is an assertion which conveys both the trans-
temporal continuity of the self and the continuous fluctuation and dialogue of the self.   
As mentioned above, it is crucial to the individual’s experience of a continuous 
self that they are able to construct a coherent narrative, which extends beyond dialogical 
fluctuations in self-positions.  Lysaker et al (2005) suggest that the significance of being 
able to create a narrative of self relates specifically to the function of narrative in 
generating history.  Appealing to the insights of Habermas, Lysaker et al suggest that 
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ones sense of ones own life history is a dialogical and intersubjective experience, and is 
a sense which is constituted by ones ability to appropriate the variousness of the 
dialogical self across fluctuations in time.   
Now that a sufficient understanding of the dialogical self has been provided, it is 
necessary to consider this understanding in relation to the schizophrenic experience.  
Lysaker et al (2002) propose the notion that schizophrenia is at least partially defined by 
a “disruption in the sense of self” (ibid, p. 207), and suggest that the experience of 
narrative incoherence is definitive of the phenomenology of schizophrenia.  This 
narrative incoherence has been otherwise described as a “fragmentation of self” 
(Lysaker & Lysaker, 2005, p. 11), in which certain aspects of self become disembedded 
in relation to other aspects, rendering them disconnected from the individual’s narration 
of their history.  Lysaker et al propose that the fundamental “problem” experienced by 
individuals with schizophrenia is a difficulty with maintaining internal dialogue, resulting 
in a compromised sense of self (Lysaker, Johannesen & Lysaker, 2005; Lysaker & 
Lysaker, 2001, 2002, 2005).  This difficulty is related to the impaired associative process 
which characterises schizophrenia.  That is to say, for individuals with schizophrenia, the 
capacity to associate one self-position with another self-position, and to move from one 
to the next, is rendered impoverished. 
As noted, it is here proposed that the self is multiple, and is constituted by a 
dialogue between distinct voices, which communicate various self-positions.  These self-
positions fluctuate in relation to one another, and in relation to the external environment.  
The individual’s capacity to respond to the interpersonal demands made by others is an 
indication of their capacity to tolerate and negotiate the internal movement between the 
various self-positions.  What is being sketched here is an image of the internal 
constitution of self as being polyphonic (Lysaker & Lysaker, 2005), which is to suggest 
that the dialogue between aspects of self is largely characterised by a harmonic 
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interaction between diverse voices.  Lysaker et al (2005) describe the schizophrenic 
experience as a vital disintegration of this harmony, and thus a disintegration of the 
dialogical self.   
2.4.3 (b)  Schizophrenia and the interpersonal: Polyphony, cacophony and 
monologue 
Focusing now on schizophrenic intersubjectvity specifically, it has been noted 
that individuals with schizophrenia experience a tenuous sense of self, which is often 
disclosed as a condition of feeling “fused” with others (Fromm-Reichmann, 1959, in 
Lysaker, Johannesen & Lysaker, 2005).  Parnas and Handest (2003) describe a person 
whose experience of the interpersonal was defined by a sense of confusion as to whose 
thoughts belonged to whom, and a feeling of invasion by the other.  Stanghellini (in 
Lysaker, et al, 2005) documented the experience of individuals with schizophrenia 
avoiding social contact because of a fear of losing themselves in the interaction, 
accompanied by a fear of loss of ownership of their life and personal identity.   
It is suggested that, given the understanding of the self as comprised of various 
self-positions emerging in dialogue with one another, and given the suggestion that 
individuals with schizophrenia experience difficulty in maintaining this internal dialogue, 
the demands placed on the dialogical self by the interpersonal domain pose the threat of 
disintegration to the individual with schizophrenia (ibid.).  Let me clarify this statement.  
As has been suggested, the disclosure of the self as a self is primarily constituted by 
interactions with others.  In relation to this proposition it is suggested that the emergence 
of the self, considered as a relational disclosure of the individual within a shared world, 
unfolds as an interpersonally propelled dialogue between internal self-positions, which 
relate to one another and to the interpersonal context.  It is then suggested that 
individuals with schizophrenia have been shown to experience difficulty in maintaining 
this internal dialogue.  This difficulty in maintaining internal dialogue is seen in relation to 
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the individual with schizophrenia manifesting impoverished associative processes, which 
in some way debilitate the individual’s capacity to move from one aspect of self to 
another.  The difficulty with moving from one self-position to the next, that is, the difficulty 
with maintaining internal dialogue, has been articulated differently as the central 
narrative incoherence which can be considered to shape the schizophrenic experience.  
Lysaker and Lysaker (2005) suggest that being present to an interpersonal context 
demands of individuals with schizophrenia that they sustain internal dialogue between 
self-positions.  These demands are considered by the authors to present individuals with 
schizophrenia with the threat of disintegration and invasion by the other.   
It is now necessary to consider exactly how this disintegration is disclosed 
experientially in the individual with schizophrenia.  As has been noted, dialogue within 
the self is propelled through fluctuations in the interpersonal context.  It is suggested that 
these fluctuations contribute to a dilapidation of internal polyphony in individuals with 
schizophrenia, which is experienced as a sense of disintegration (Lysaker, Johannesen 
& Lysaker, 2005).  Polyphony in the context of the dialogical self is understood as 
coherence in the motioning of the various self-positions in uncomplicated relation to the 
interpersonal context.  For individuals with schizophrenia it is suggested that through a 
disruption in the flow of dialogue this polyphony is disrupted, resulting either in a state of 
internal cacophony, or monologue (Lysaker & Lysaker, 2002).    
For these authors this disruption, which amounts to a feeling of disintegration, 
could emerge in one of two ways.  Firstly, internal dialogue could be disrupted if self-
positions were ordered in such a way that the individual becomes unable to respond 
adequately to experience.  In this sense, the structure of the dialogue could disintegrate 
through an incapacity to negotiate the shifting dominance of the various self-positions in 
relation to one another. Dialogue would cease if self-positions were unable to respond 
adequately to interpersonal demands, thus creating a sense of internal cacophony; a 
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profound intrapsychic confusion which brings with it the threat of disintegration (ibid.).  
The cacophonic experience can be grasped as the multiple voices of the self, screaming 
all at once, unable to emerge in any hierarchical structure.  The multiple selves would 
remain alive, but without being ordered into patterns of shifting dominance that would 
characterise a coherent internal polyphony.   
The second way in which a disruption of dialogue could emerge would be 
through the forced reduction of the multiple selves to a limited monologal self.  For 
Lysaker and Lysaker (2001) the individual with schizophrenia may respond to the threat 
posed by their own incapacity to sustain dialogue by condensing the various selves into 
a non-evolving and “non-interacting amalgam” (ibid, p. 28), thus eliminating the 
possibility of internal dialogue.  In this sense a few, or possibly a single self-position 
would emerge concretely and pervasively as dominant, and the individual would unfold 
cross-contextually as manifesting a limited number of fairly entrenched self-positions 
(Lysaker & Lysaker, 2005).  In this instance the emergence and dominance of a limited 
number of self-positions would render the individual’s opportunity for internal dialogue 
reduced.  The authors suggest that the ascendance and dominance of few self-positions 
is connected with the reported experience of desolation and feeling-barren described by 
the individuals who partook in their research, and is as well connected with the flatness 
of affect commonly known as negative symptomatology (ibid.).  The authors further 
suggest that the emergence of monologue can be understood as connected with the 
experience of self-destruction and disintegration that has been described by individuals 
with schizophrenia.  In this sense the dominance of one or few self-positions is disclosed 
phenomenologically as the destruction, or annihilation, of the variety of other self-
positions whose communications are thwarted through the emergence of the monologal 
self.   
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
This research process unfolded as a qualitative exploration into the lived 
experience of a single individual, aimed towards examining the essence of her being-in-
the-world-amongst-other-people as a person with schizophrenia.  Phenomenological 
hermeneutics was the methodological platform upon which this work was staged, and 
manifested as an attempt to allow for a description of lived experience, and a 
consequent analysis the tradition and history inscribed in the languaging of that 
experience.   
3.1  Data collection: Holding the phenomenological interview 
Data collection unfolded as a series of seven unstructured interviews, which 
occurred once-weekly, and lasted between 30 minutes to 1 hour in length.  For the 
purpose of securing confidentiality, all interviews were tape recorded and transcribed by 
myself.  Also for reasons of confidentiality, tapes and transcriptions remained secure in 
my office throughout the research process.   
As a phenomenologically informed process, the interviewing was characterised 
as an attempt to elicit nuanced descriptions of the participant’s lived experience through 
initially inviting responses to broad and open-ended questions (Giorgi, 1997).  In the 
interviews I aimed to establish a dialogical dynamic in which both researcher and 
participant were enabled to engage from positions of equal power in the relationship.  
Habermas (1984), cited in Kelly (1999), proposes the absence of dominance in the 
dialogical participation as facilitating free communication within the dialogue.  However it 
must be acknowledged that interviews did manifest a degree of power dynamic, which 
was clearly explicated as part of the process.     
The interviews were conversational in nature, and were realised as a dyadic co-
creation of the interview process, constructed by both researcher and participant.  Much 
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of the interview process was characterised by a strong emotional charge in the 
participant’s narrative.  I attempted to contain this emotional charge whilst 
simultaneously sustaining the notion of the interview relationship as being other than a 
therapeutic relationship.  Kvale (1996) proposes the notion of the research conversation 
as a mode of human interaction geared towards creating knowledge through the mutual 
engagement of subjectivities.  Gadamer (1989) conceptualises the interview 
conversation as a co-presentation of one subjectivity in relation to another, with the 
mutual goal of understanding the meaning which one individual ascribes to their 
experience.  The model of Socratic dialogue, as described in Kvale (1996), was 
employed.  This model envisages movement in the conversation from a place of 
ignorance, through the medium of constantly refined questioning, towards a place of 
enlightenment.  In this sense my questioning was guided by an attempt, through 
reflection with the participant, to establish successive approximations of the participant’s 
intended meaning. With this in mind, I initiated the interviews by introducing in very 
broad terms the area of experience towards which I hoped to aim the interviews.  I then 
invited the participant to take free reign in terms of the particular aspects of that 
experience, namely intersubjectivity, which she felt most salient to her.  Throughout the 
interviews I asked questions relating specifically to the salient experiences which the 
participant herself was describing.   An example of this is provided in the appendix, in 
which an interview transcription is provided.   
With the aim in mind of allowing the observed phenomenon to express itself as it 
is lived in the individual’s daily experience, the interviews were geared towards 
establishing a sense of the participant’s experience of living with schizophrenia within 
the interpersonal context.  Keen (1975) delineates a focus, within the phenomenological 
interview, on describing experience as embedded self-reflectively within a spatial, 
temporal and interpersonal context.  In this sense it was important to establish the 
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participant’s unique manner of locating her own experience in a spatial, temporal and 
dialogical lived world, such that the immediately lived nature of the experience could be 
narrated.  In relation to this, the interviews were conceptualised in methodological 
alignment with Strasser’s (1969) dialogical phenomenology.  Strasser, cited in 
Polkinghorne (1989), proposes the notion of meaning as arising between rather than 
within individual subjectivities.  In this sense I aimed the interview process towards 
eliciting a narration of the participant’s sense of self as located interactionally and 
dialogically within her world.  Individual subjectivity was explored in terms of its 
manifestation as a “we” rather than an “I”, and as situated reciprocally within a world with 
which that subjectivity is in dialogue (ibid.).  Significant to phenomenological 
hermeneutic research is a focus on the individual’s experience of everyday-ness 
(Packer, 1985).  In this sense the nature of the individual’s practical engagement with 
her world on an immediate, embodied level, was explored in depth throughout the 
interview process.   
A discussion of the interview process would be incomplete without a description 
of the interpersonal complexities which arose at times within the relationship.  Primarily, 
the complexities emerged in relation to Sharon’s expressed difficulty with articulating the 
meaning which she wished to convey.  Her languaging of her experience was at times 
notably vague, diffuse, and even tangential, rendering her narrative difficult to interpret.  
Sharon seemed to find it difficult to answer certain questions, and seemed to drift in her 
responses.  Such questions related most notably to Sharon’s apprehension of herself in 
terms of her interpersonal engagements.  In a sense she seemed to experience difficulty 
with articulating exactly what it is about engaging interpersonally that is so challenging 
for her.  Another important difficulty which emerged in the interview process related to 
Sharon’s tendency to tire quite quickly.  The nature of the questioning, and the 
immediacy of the interpersonal engagement, seemed to exhaust her.  It is important to 
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acknowledge here that the research process is one which unfolds on both an internal 
and interpersonal intersubjective level.  With this in mind I held the complexities 
emerging in the interview process reflectively, allowing them to inform my understanding 
and interpretation of the nature of Sharon’s interpersonal experience beyond the 
research process.  
Apart from interview data, the participant further provided me with written 
narrations of her lived experience.  The participant composed a series of pieces of 
writing in which she described an intrapersonal dialogue between two clearly identified 
and named aspects of her personality, which I have named Adrienne and Sharon.  As 
with the interview data, written data were transcribed, remaining faithful to the contents 
of the descriptions.  The original copy of the writing was returned to the participant, and, 
in service of maintaining confidentiality, transcriptions did not leave my office.  An 
example of this writing has been attached in the appendix.  
In terms of the validity and reliability of the data collection process, it must firstly 
be noted that transcription reliability was secured through my listening to the recordings 
three times before transcribing, so as to secure a correct hearing of the data.  In terms of 
reliability as it pertained to the data collection process, I was aware of the possibility of 
inconsistencies emerging from one interview to the next.  I attempted to accommodate 
this possibility by asking similar questions repeatedly, with the aim of establishing the 
degree of internal consistency, or narrative ambiguity, which emerged in the participant’s 
account.  It is important to note that hermeneutic interpretation engages with the plurality 
of meanings, potentially ambivalent and discontinuous, which could emerge in the 
individual’s narrative (Kvale, 1996).  Engaging with this plurality does imply an allowance 
of the notion that meaning can emerge variously, and this notion must be factored into 
considerations of reliability and the hermeneutic process.  In terms of the validity of the 
data collection process, as noted previously, I aimed to establish a sense of equivalence 
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in terms of the power dynamic in the interviews.  With this in mind, the notion of 
intersubjective agreement emerged as significant (ibid.).  Throughout the interview 
process I engaged with the participant in an attempt to display my understandings of 
what she was saying.  Through this I encouraged her to correct or refine my 
interpretations and understandings should they misshape her intended meaning in any 
way.  The aim of this was to establish a degree of intersubjective agreement within the 
data collection and analysis process, which may contribute to the validity of that process.   
3.2  Hermeneutic phenomenology: The revelation of experience as text and texture 
This exposition of method will unfold as an expression of the methodology and 
epistemology of phenomenological hermeneutics, and a consideration of the hazy line 
which separates pure phenomenology from hermeneutic phenomenology.  It is firstly 
necessary to present an understanding of phenomenology, as conceptualised from 
within the Husserlian, Heideggerian and Merleau-Pontian tradition.   
Phenomenological research unfolds as an attendance to the “fidelity of the 
phenomenon as it is lived” (Giorgi, 1975).  The phenomenological agenda is directed 
towards an elicitation of the lived world through descriptions of the individual’s being-in-
the-world.  The notion of being-in-the-world is characterised in phenomenology as the 
motional location of individual subjectivity.  Subjectivity is seen as immediately located in 
a lived context, whilst being simultaneously dynamically propelled towards an intended 
future (Sartre, 1943, 1970).  This notion emerges as the theoretical pinnacle of pure 
phenomenology, which is Husserl’s conception of intentionality (Husserl, 1927; Palmer, 
1971).  Intentionality is a feature of human consciousness characterised by the 
directedness of consciousness towards an object that is other than consciousness itself 
(Brooke, 1991).  The concept of consciousness as intentional implies an outward-
directedness, in which human subjectivity is seen in engagement with the world.  And so 
we see a theory of being-in-the-world, which denotes existence as a dialogue between 
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self and world.  This provides for the phenemenological researcher a position of 
attending to lived experience in a way which grasps that experience as shared and 
dialogical (Willis, 2001).  Willis articulates phenomenology as a focus on “the things 
themselves”. In this sense phenomenology emerges as an attempt to “illumine” the 
quality of a phenomenon, as that phenomenon is perceived by the experiencing 
individual.  This mode of perception is delineated by Merleau-Ponty (1962) as an 
unclouded attunement to the life-world, as lived by individual subjectivity   
Three phenomenological procedures will be presented here as definitive of what 
can be called pure phenomenology.  Spinelli (1989) delineates these procedures as the 
rules of epoche, description and horizonalisation.  Crucial to pure phenomenology, the 
epoche unfolds as a “bracketing” of those knowledges which may misshape the 
researcher’s apprehension of the phenomenon.  Ashworth (1996) describes this 
suspension of assumption as an idealistic approach to coming to know the phenomenon, 
and suggests that a full bracketing of assumption is impossible, but must nonetheless 
unfold as a methodological aspiration.  The epoche will emerge as less significant to this 
research process, which is hermeneutically informed.  The epoche does remain 
important to this process, however, in that it inspires in the researcher an effort to be 
“transparent” in relation to his awareness and speculations (Moustakas, 1994).  This 
transparency enables the researcher to grasp the dialogue between his knowledges, 
and the knowledges emerging through the process of analysis.    
The next rule, intrinsic to both pure and hermeneutic phenomenology, is that of 
description.  Phenomenological description manifests as free of explanation (Spinelli, 
1989).  In this sense the goal of phenomenological research is the revelation of lived 
experience through faithful, concrete descriptions aimed at disclosing the textural quality 
of experience (Moustakas, 1994).   
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The third and final rule of phenomenological praxis is that of horizonalisation 
(Spinelli, 1989), which emerges as an equalisation in the researcher’s approach to data.  
All units of information in phenomenological data, referred to by Kruger (1988) as 
“natural meaning units”, are approached as holding equal importance in relation to one 
another.  The rule suggests that the researcher should initially avoid imposing 
hierarchies of meaning onto the data.  It is suggested that through avoiding the 
imposition of their own assumptions of hierarchy onto the data, the researcher is better 
able to provide a faithful description of the observed phenomenon (Spinelli, 1989).   
I would now like to pursue a description of hermeneutic phenomenology, which 
does manifest some core methodological and epistemological differences from pure 
phenomenology.  The philosophical hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer will be 
articulated in this section.  Gadamer’s hermeneutic encourages that the researcher 
acknowledge their own system of knowledges, such that those knowledges can remain 
transparent (Gadamer, 1976).  Hermeneutics is concerned primarily with understanding 
texts.  This emerges in relation to hermeneutic ontology, which maintains that human 
experience is essentially semantic and textual in structure and expression (Packer, 
1985; Hein & Austin, 2001).  Von Eckartsberg (1986) conceptualised the hermeneutic 
exploration as an investigation of the life-text, commenting on the linguality of human 
experience.  Gadamer’s original assertion that “being that can be understood is 
language” (cited in Palmer, 1969, p. 42) emerges as the formative assertion of the 
linguistic character of being.  For the hermeneuticist this facilitates an approach to 
human experience as a multi-layered text which enables thick and plurivocal 
descriptions (Kahn, 2000).  This plurivocity of meaning as inherent to language was also 
noted by Schulte (2000), who identified the interrelatedness between the system of 
meanings expressed through the text, and the embeddedness of those meanings in a 
lived social world. 
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As noted, it is accepted that the researcher can never fully detach from those 
assumptions which may impact upon their reading of the text.  These assumptions need 
to be held in the researcher’s reflective approach to the subject.  Gadamer (1975) 
developed the notion of the horizon, denoting this as the range of vision from a particular 
point of reference.  He suggested that understanding unfolds in the research process 
through a “fusion of horizons”, which emerges through both parties allowing for the entry 
and alignment of their knowledges (Sullivan & McCarthy, 2005).  It can be seen how this 
manifests as unlike pure phenomenology, which locates the researcher as invisible 
within the process of meaning-making.  Husserl’s pure phenomenology can however be 
seen as pre-empting hermeneutic phenomenology’s dialogical thread.  Husserl, cited in 
Hunter (2004), denotes the world of fact and interpretation as a world co-constituted 
through interaction.  The concept of dialogicality in phenomenology was expressed by 
Masek (1983), who envisaged the fusion of horizons as a dialogue between viewpoints.   
Gadamer constructed the research process as a dialogical interpretive 
relationship in which researcher interacted with text as an “I” in relation to a “Thou” 
(Aylesworth, 1991).  In this sense, for Gadamer text is experience, and experience 
unfolds as historically embodied, and existing contemporaneously with the researcher.  
Sardello (1975) articulated this notion in the following statement:  
“We can approach a text as a human voice out of the past, a voice that asks to 
be heard, and that requests a response … The text’s suspension from the world 
can be removed, returning the text to a living communication.” (Sardello, p. 275)  
In this sense data gleaned through the interview process are grasped within the 
hermeneutic process as a living embodiment of the experiencing individual’s bringing-
into-being-through-language of their tradition and history (Moran, 2000).  Fundamental to 
the emergence of meaning through hermeneutic dialogue is the notion of the 
hermeneutic circle.  Packer (1985) articulated the hermeneutic method as a progressive 
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uncovering of experience, against the background of the narrator and the examiner of 
that experience.  Hermeneutic analysis begins as parts of the text are grasped in relation 
to the whole text, and vice versa.  This process sets up a dialectic within the analysis of 
data, in which the researcher’s understandings of smaller units of the text are continually 
refined in relation to a dynamic understanding of the text as a whole (Kahn, 2000). Now 
that a sufficient theoretical grounding has been laid, I would like to proceed with a fusion 
of the more purely phenomenological method described, presenting this fusion as the 
analytic procedure of this research.  
3.3  Data Analysis: Dialectics and the hermeneutic motion 
The hermeneutic phenomenological analysis of a text involves a progressive 
motioning from raw data collected, towards a narrative of meaning.  This process, Kahn 
(2000) suggests, involves a full immersion within the data through reading and re-
reading the text in multiple ways, and in no set order.  The aim of this repetitious reading 
is to facilitate in the researcher the development of an orienting interpretation of the text, 
which will allow for the emergence of significant themes from the text.   
The next phase in the hermeneutic process is that of data reduction.  This step 
necessitates that the researcher decide which parts of the text emerge as central, and 
which seem less relevant.  The data is then subjected to a process of line-by-line coding, 
which facilitates the analysis of themes.  Throughout the researcher must engage in the 
dialectic that is the hermeneutic circle.  This dialectic must occur within the text, in the 
form of coming to know parts of the text variously in relation to the whole text, and 
coming to know the whole in relation to its parts (Reeder, 1998).  Moran (2000) 
articulates the notion of a conversation between aspects of the text; between researcher 
and participant, as well as within each self engaged in the meaning-making process.  
The hermeneutic circle also emerges in relation to Gadamer’s fusion of horizons, which 
sees a dynamic interaction between knowledges existing within researcher and 
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participant, both prior to the research process and emerging during the process (Laverty, 
2003).   
“Hermeneutics invites participants into an ongoing conversation, but does not 
provide a set methodology.  Understanding occurs through a fusion of horizons, 
which is a dialectic between the pre-understandings of the research process, the 
interpretive framework, and the sources of information.” (Koch, 1995, in Laverty, 
2003) 
In relation to this statement I shall employ elements of Giorgi’s phenomenological 
praxis.  Giorgi (1970) proposes the phenomenological attendance to the life-world as 
based in openness to future possibility and past facticity.  Giorgi put forward a 
phenomenological research method constituted by four steps, each unfolding within the 
research process in dialogue with one another.  Initially, the researcher must read 
through the full body of text gathered in an effort to get a sense of the text as a whole 
(Giorgi, 1985).  Once this process of immersion in the life-text is complete, the 
researcher goes back to the beginning, rereading the text multiple times, this time with 
the more distantiated aim of identifying specific meaning units within the text, with 
particular reference to the phenomenon being observed.  Kelly (1999) cites the 
interchange of empathy and distantiation as a further dialogue within the hermeneutic 
motion.   
From this point the researcher must then work through the isolated meaning 
units, approaching each unit in terms of its relation to the life-text as constituted by 
various parts and as a whole (Knaack, 1984).  It can be seen how this motion 
instantiates a hermeneutic trend in the research process, insofar as a dialogue is being 
created between units of meaning in relation to the entire text.  This multiple rereading, it 
is suggested, allows for the phenomenon to reveal itself multifariously to the researcher. 
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“Stay with the phenomenon, let it be in its appearance, view it from different 
angles, persist to the point of exhausting what it offers during a particular time 
and place of perceiving and experiencing.” (Moustakas, 1994, p. 92) 
For Giorgi, the final step in the process is to synthesize the units of meaning into 
a coherent statement, which should emerge as a narrative of the individual’s experience 
(Giorgi, 1970).  This narrative must then engage in a dialogue of validation, in which the 
researcher must return both to the data protocols as well as to the research participant, 
in an effort to secure consensual validation of the phenomenological description 
generated.   
Throughout this process the rules of horizonalisation and the epoche must be 
held in the researcher’s awareness.  The epoche does not hold ground to the same 
extent in this more specifically hermeneutic research.  However, it is important for the 
hermeneuticist to maintain a high degree of transparency, attempting throughout the 
research process to be aware of those knowledges which inform him or her.  As noted, 
the generation of knowledge, as understood within phenomenological hermeneutics, is 
an intersubjective and dialogical process, and so the researcher’s own history, tradition, 
knowledge and personhood holds a space within the process.  I would now like to 
proceed with an account of the process of participant selection, exploring case study 
research as it has unfolded in this project.   
3.4.1  Case study methodology and phenomenological research 
In terms of the decision to adopt a case study method of investigation, it was 
considered essential both to the methodology and the nature of the phenomenon being 
investigated that a data collection procedure which enables the emergence of rich, 
ideographic information be utilised.  An exploration of the individual as individual, as 
facilitated by case study procedure, was seen to enable the disclosure of immediate, 
subjectively lived experience (Lindegger, 1999).  Hermeneutic phenomenology’s 
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devotion to the significance of language in the revelation of experience inspired the 
decision to engage explicitly with the narrative of one individual, allowing that narrative to 
unfold multiply and longitudinally, thus providing thick information on the phenomenon 
being observed.   
As a descriptive and interpretive methodology, phenomenology makes an 
important distinction between straightforward experience and reflective experience 
(Spinelli, 1989).  Straightforward experience is delineated as the event as experienced in 
the moment of being in that event.  Straightforward experience is considered partially 
incommunicable, as it is partially prior to reflection.  Reflective experience is proposed as 
a processing of lived experience which renders that experience communicable, and 
therefore interpretable.  Reflective experience is clarified further as the seat of the 
phenomenological “I”; that is, the self’s experience of itself within a lived context.  Case 
study research is proposed as enabling an immediate apprehension of the 
phenomenological “I”, the experiencing self, as that self languages its own reflective 
experience.   
In terms of the applicability of case study methodology, Kelly (1999) supports the 
notion that case study research can be considered highly applicable when incorporated 
within a qualitative research endeavour aimed at exploring and enriching existing 
research.  This project, as noted, has its informative routes in phenomenological 
research relating to schizophrenia and the dialogical model of self.  The use of case 
study methodology to explore the veracity of this research is therefore considered 
appropriate to the research design.  Further to this, the long-term availability of the 
participant enabled a sustained interview process, which facilitated an unlimited and 
longitudinal data collection.  The discontinuation of the data collection process, within the 
context of case study research, occurs when researcher and participant agree that a 
point of theoretical saturation has been reached (Kelly, 1999).  For this reason I was 
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unable to determine the exact number of interviews which would be necessary to 
complete the study.  Theoretical saturation occurs when there is mutual consensus that 
no new information is emerging, which could challenge or contribute to the emerging 
narrative account of the phenomenon being observed.  As noted, the point of theoretical 
saturation was determined in the dialogue between researcher and participant.   
 Issue of validity and reliability is of prime concern within any research process.  
The data collection and analysis process embraced in this project was largely informed 
by its emergence as a case study research, and this has important implications in terms 
of the reader’s understandings and expectations regarding what constitutes validity and 
reliability.  Importantly, this project aims at a thick description of lived experience.  It 
does not aim to suggest that the experience being described is universal.  Rather, it 
aims to describe and validate individual experience, reveal the nuances of that 
experience, and articulate the possibility that others may share that experience.  In this 
respect, the plurality of meaning, the richness of texture and the immediacy of reflective 
experience which a case study design is considered to facilitate, supports the validity of 
this work in terms of collection and analysis of data.  Further to this, Spinelli (1989) 
proposes the notion of intersubjective validity, which he delineates as the emergence of 
validity through the reciprocal exchange between researcher and participant.  In this 
sense, the researcher’s estimations of meaning are confirmed or disconfirmed, clarified 
or altered, through dialogical exchange with the participant.  This process, which is 
central to interviewing as it unfolds in case study research, is considered to enable and 
secure the researcher’s understandings, with respect to the validity of those 
understandings (ibid.).   
3.4.2  Participant selection: The Case of Adrienne and Sharon 
The participant for the study was chosen according to a fairly uncomplicated set 
of criteria, which included the following: Most crucially, it was necessary that the 
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participant be informed of the fact that he or she has been diagnosed with a 
schizophrenic illness, as delineated in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (IV-TR).  The subtype of the diagnosis was not considered relevant to the 
study, however the participant is diagnosed with Paranoid Schizophrenia, and so the 
findings from this study may be considered to be of particular relevance to individuals 
diagnosed with this particular type of schizophrenia.  What was considered important as 
a criterion for selection was the duration of the period of illness.  It was considered 
essential that the participant had been diagnosed more than one year prior to the data 
collection process.  This was considered important because the individual would need to 
have had longitudinal experience of being-in-the-world as a person with schizophrenia in 
order to make extensive commentary on the nature of the experience.   
In terms of the age of the participant, it was considered important that he or she 
be older than 21 and younger than 45.  This limitation refines the focus of the study to 
the experiences of adults suffering from schizophrenia.  Further to this, the possibility of 
age-related cognitive decline emerging comorbidly may complicate the presentation of 
an individual with schizophrenia, thus suggesting that an older participant’s experience 
may be different to that of someone in early to middle adulthood.  The participant’s 
culture, race and gender were not considered relevant to the criteria for selection.  
It was also considered essential that the participant not be diagnosed with a 
comorbid mood, anxiety, personality or cognitive disorder as such a presentation may 
complicate the focus on the schizophrenic experience.   
Fundamental to the criteria for selection was the notion that the participant, 
throughout the course of the data collection process, not manifest any psychotic 
symptoms.  This was considered important for a variety of reasons.  Primarily the 
psychotic individual cannot give legal consent to participation in research, and so 
working with a psychotic individual would render the study ethically unsound.  It was also 
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made clear to the participant that should she exhibit any symptoms during the research 
process which may indicate the emergence of psychosis, her participation would 
necessarily be discontinued.   
The expression of experience through language reveals subtleties and 
colourations which shape human subjectivity and phenomenal experience.  For the sake 
of grasping the subtleties of the participant’s use of language, it was considered 
essential to participation in the study that the participant be able to speak English 
fluently.  
Finally, it was considered essential that the participant be fully informed, prior to 
commencement with the study, of the nature of his or her diagnosis.  Whether the 
participant concurs with the diagnosis or not was not considered relevant.   
With these criteria in mind, the participant was sought through Fort England 
Psychiatric Hospital, Grahamstown.  The hospital discharge ward houses individuals 
pre-discharge, and the participant was found in this ward.  After I spent some time with 
the participant engaging in a brief therapeutic intervention, she was discharged from the 
ward.  It was following her discharge that I approached the participant regarding the 
possibility of her participation in the study.  The participant was informed of the details of 
the study, and of her rights in engagement with the study.  These rights were delineated 
in a contractual agreement signed by the participant, myself, and the research 
supervisor.  (The agreement is attached to in the appendix of this project.)  
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS 
This chapter will be presented as a narrative of the experience of the participant 
who contributed to this study.  It is important, in terms of my effort to maintain 
phenomenological integrity, that this narrative unfold as free of theoretical assumptions 
which may transform the essence of the experience.  However it must be acknowledged 
that I do enter the research process with my own system of knowledges, which engage 
in a dialogue with the participant’s expressions.  In service of enabling transparency in 
terms of my own impact on the narrative it is important that brief mention is made of the 
kinds of theoretical, social and cultural assumptions which may have interacted with my 
apprehension of the participant’s telling of her experience. 
Firstly, this project has to a certain extent been informed by previous research 
into the intersubjective experience of people diagnosed with a mental illness (Knight & 
Bradfield, 2003).  The work focused on the experience of three people diagnosed with a 
variety of illnesses, examining being-diagnosed in terms of the impact on the individual’s 
intersubjective experience.  The results gleaned from this previous research, although 
quite different to the current project, may have had an influence on my understandings.  
Secondly, as therapist, I am psychodynamically oriented, and this orientation may be 
seen as shaping, to an extent, my languaging of the participant’s experience.  Finally, as 
has been noted, prior to engaging with the participant in the research process, I was 
involved in a short-term therapy with her when she was an inpatient at Fort England 
Psychiatric Hospital.  This process may have impacted on my current understandings 
insofar as my knowledge of the participant had been informed, prior to engagement in 
the research process, both by psychiatric staff in the hospital as well as by the 
participant’s mother. 
 53 
By way of introducing this narrative of experience, it is necessary to furnish the 
reader with some details regarding the participant.  Sharon4
4.1  Reading the life-text: A narration of being-in-relation 
 is a white woman in her 
mid-twenties.  She works as a chef.  She has been diagnosed with Schizophrenia, 
Paranoid Type, and her condition is commonly defined by mildly disorganised speech 
and thought content, with the emergence of delusions, mostly persecutory, when she 
experiences a psychotic episode.  She has experienced two psychotic episodes, her 
most recent being five months prior to engaging in the research process.  Sharon 
narrated herself as a religious woman, who has a strong love of people, and derives 
much satisfaction and meaning from being “creative”.  Her sense of self as neglected, 
abandoned and persecuted in relation to her family speaks firmly through her reflections 
on her self.  The first section (4.1) of this presentation of results will unfold as a 
comprehensive narrative of the participant’s experience, as she described it.  In this 
section all themes which emerged from the data, central and peripheral, will be noted. 
This will be followed in section 4.2 by a more detailed delineation of the core themes, 
which emerged as most significant in terms of Sharon’s experience.   
From the series of interviews conducted, as well as the written data provided, it 
emerged that Sharon experiences a great deal of isolation in her existence as a social 
being.  This isolation emerged primarily in relation to her feeling of being chronically 
misunderstood5
                                                 
4 The participant described two aspects of herself, which have been named Sharon and Adrienne.  Neither 
of these are real names.  The name Sharon is a pseudonym for the name which the participant uses to refer 
to herself.   
, and her feeling that those who are not mentally ill could not possibly 
empathise with her, and could not understand “where she is coming from”.  The feeling 
of being misunderstood was described in relation to an anxiety which Sharon 
5 The italicised words represent the themes which emerged in the reading of the data.    
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experiences, relating to her feeling that she is unable to communicate her feelings and 
thoughts effectively to others.   
“S6
R – If you don’t come across properly in the way that you’re trying to get across 
to that person.   
 – Um, if there is frustration and agitation, and if you don’t come across 
properly in the way that you’re trying to get across to that person.   
S – Ja, like how you’re trying to voice your opinion.  How you’re trying to get 
across the way that you feel.  How you would relate that to a situation that you’re 
trying to work through.” 
The perception of others being unable to empathise with her, apart from its 
attachment to her sense of being-isolated, was connected in Sharon’s description with 
feeling-abandoned, most particularly by her family, whom she feels are unable to “grasp 
her meaning”.  Sharon’s sense of isolation was further described as an experience of 
being unsupported by others.  Her sense of isolation is further seen as being related to 
her self-doubt, in which she constantly doubts the validity of her existence, and doubts 
the value of her contributions in social situations.  This experience of doubt emerged 
variously as a caution in interpersonal relationships, as well as more existential doubt, in 
which Sharon came to question her own being-in-the-world. 
“You feel very lonely, and you feel cut off from the rest of society.  You feel 
abandoned, and you constantly keep doubting yourself.  You question yourself.  
You keep asking yourself questions.  Am I doing the right thing?  Who am I in this 
time?” 
The experience of feeling misunderstood, seen here as constituting Sharon’s 
experience of isolation, is further connected with her sense that she is unheard by those 
with whom she interacts.  She experiences a sense of disconnection from others through 
                                                 
6 S = Sharon; R = Researcher 
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them not listening to what she is saying.  Sharon articulated this feeling of isolation and 
disconnection most lucidly in the following statement: 
“You’re like stranded on a desert island.  And there’s nothing.  There’s just like 
birds and trees.  And you’ve just got to make do with that.” 
In this description I also note the experience of existing “in a barren place” of which 
Sharon spoke.  She suggested that her interpersonal experiences at times affect this 
feeling-barren, which is an experience Sharon attached to her sense of aloneness and 
detachment.  
“I think you go into the barren place sometimes through people, or relationships 
that happen.  At times you find it difficult so you’re kind of stranded and you land 
up there and you need to find your way out of there.” 
Sharon’s experience of being-in-relation, as experienced after her being 
diagnosed with schizophrenia, has come to be defined by her sense of herself as probed 
and invaded by a disrespectful other.  This experience is largely defined by Sharon’s 
experience of being constantly checked and questioned by others, who ask “120 
questions” in order that they may assess her mental illness.  The experience is 
connected with a sense that something is taken out of her.  As Sharon herself 
articulated: “They’re taking my soul away.”   
In terms of her experience of herself in close interpersonal relationships, Sharon 
suggested that her main concern relates to the lack of reciprocity which she 
experiences.  In this sense Sharon described a feeling of being abused by others, whose 
contributions to the relationship are, as she experiences it, far less substantial than her 
contributions.  She described a wish for others to “meet her half way”, and suggested 
that she does not often have this experience. 
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“I always felt that I had to give.  And I was giving so much and never receiving.  
And I thought, ok, I’m going to do my own thing, and they must do their own 
thing.  And they must meet me halfway.  And they’ve never met me halfway.” 
Central to Sharon’s experience of herself in relation to others, and central to the 
findings of this project, is her experience of difficulty in being-in-relation-to-the-other in a 
way which she feels they would like her to be.  This difficulty emerged in a variety of 
ways.  Firstly, it was disclosed as Sharon’s rejection of that part of herself which she 
called Adrienne7, and her feeling of being pressured into being-Adrienne by others, who 
rejected the emergence of SharonI8
Another element of Sharon’s interpersonal experience which she described is her 
expression of a fairly limited range of modes of interpersonal engagement.  In this sense 
Sharon articulated her expectation that certain people should interact in a certain way, 
should say certain things, and should ask certain questions.  The failure of the other to 
engage in a manner fitting her expectations was connected with a feeling of being 
dominated and controlled by the other, a tendency to respond to the other with anger, as 
well as with the above-mentioned experience of having part of herself taken from her.   
.  This will be explored fully in the delineation of core 
themes to follow.  Sharon’s experience of herself in relationships, as was described, 
seemed to be shaped largely by her need to resist being-for-the-other.  In this sense she 
felt a tremendous amount of pressure, imposed on her by the other, to become 
Adrienne, and she raged against this pressure through asserting the Sharon aspect of 
her self.  Sharon spoke often of not wanting to “put on a mask”, by which she intended, 
amongst other things, a need to resist being as others wanted her to be.   
                                                 
7 Adrienne is the participant’s original name, which she used to refer to herself until after her second 
psychotic break.  Since then she has referred to herself as Sharon. Both names are pseudonyms.   
8 The italicisation of the names Sharon and Adrienne indicates a reference to the aspect of the participant’s 
personality. When the name “Sharon” is not given in italics the author intends to refer to the participant 
herself. 
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Sharon spoke extensively of her need to be cautious in interpersonal 
relationships.  This caution, which she described as having to “walk on eggshells”, 
unfolded as a need both for herself to be cautious, so as to avoid being hurt by the other, 
and a need for the other to be cautious, so as to avoid effecting emotional disruption in 
Sharon.  Sharon described feeling anxious that she may be in some way “demoralised” 
through being in the presence of the other.  This caution was tied to Sharon’s experience 
of herself as a schizophrenic person.  She described being cautious around others who 
are not schizophrenic, and suggested that she feels anxious about “doing the wrong 
thing” and possibly upsetting others. 
“You need to basically walk on eggshells the whole time.  Hopping on ice from 
one block to the next, deciding what’s right and what’s wrong before you go 
ahead and do it.  Because you don’t want to be shouted at or demoralised in your 
own space.” 
A significant aspect of Sharon’s intersubjective experience related to her 
intolerance of ambiguity in terms of being-in-relation-to-others.  As will emerge in the 
clarification of core themes, Sharon described a fairly inflexible self-perception, defined 
by a limited range of potential modes of self-expression.  In relation to this fairly sparse 
portrayal of self was seen a difficulty with tolerating ambivalence in terms of her 
awareness of self and her being-in-relation.  In this sense Sharon was seen to 
experience difficulty in negotiating interpersonal experiences which require that she 
engage in a manner which does not fit with her fairly concrete self-descriptive mould.  
Sharon’s words describe this experience most acutely:  
“It’s very difficult, because you don’t know which side to stand on.  And you can’t 
be in between.  You’ve got to stand on one side or the other.  It’s like you’re 
being pulled.  It’s like a monkey that’s eating a jelly baby, and you’re stretching.” 
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 Another aspect of Sharon’s being-in-relation, which emerged on the periphery of 
the core themes, related to her understanding of what it means to know someone 
intimately.  For Sharon, to know someone completely is to know the nuances of their 
facial expressions and physical presence, and to be able to predict their behaviour. 
“It’s almost like you spend so much time with that person that you get to know 
them intimately.  You get to know their facial expressions, and their different 
ways of walking, and you become so close that you can know each other so well 
that you can know their next move, or what they’re going to say.  Or you can help 
them finish their sentence because you know what’s going to come next.” 
 Before proceeding with a detailed exploration of the central themes which 
emerged, it is important to comment on Sharon’s experience of positive relationships.  
Sharon suggested that her positive relationships were generally relationships with other 
mentally ill people, mostly fellow inpatients.  She described feeling-understood in these 
relationships, and suggested that through being understood she feels worthy of the 
person and the relationship.  Feeling-worthy emerged as central to Sharon’s experience 
of positive relationships, and was connected with what she described as a feeling of 
“rejuvenation”.   
“R - Tell me about the experience of feeling understood by someone? 
S – It’s like rejuvenating.  It’s like a caring and loving environment.   
R – Feeling understood is rejuvenating? 
S – Ja 
R – What does rejuvenating mean? 
S – It means that you can have substance in a friendship where there are people 
who understand you as a person.  They know your ins and outs.  So when you’re 
feeling down and you need upliftment they can bring that to you.” 
In Sharon’s statement we can see her sense of feeling made-new in a relationship which 
affirms her through understanding her. 
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4.2.1  Adrienne and Sharon: An exposition of self-perception 
 Although this articulation of results is focused specifically on Sharon’s 
intersubjective experience, it is necessary to describe her perception of herself, as this is 
seen as contributing to her experience of being-in-relation.  As has been stated, Sharon 
is the name given to the aspect of the participant’s personality which emerged after her 
second psychotic break.  Sharon and Adrienne, as aspects of personality, were 
described by the participant as distinct and contrasting.  Although she spoke rather 
ambiguously about this contrast, it seems that Sharon emerged out of Adrienne as a 
way of helping Adrienne cope with the difficulties she was experiencing in her family 
system.  Adrienne was described as ‘trapped’, ‘abused’, ‘confined’, ‘placid’ and 
‘dominated’.  Adrienne was further described as a “mask” which the participant put on.  
This putting on of the mask was disclosed as the participant’s attempt to seek 
confirmation and recognition from an otherwise disconfirming family system.  Adrienne 
was described as needing to “prove herself” to her family; needing to show them that 
she exists and is worthy.  This need was coupled by a pervasive self-doubt which 
Adrienne experienced.   
 The emergence of Sharon unfolded in the participant’s descriptions as an effort 
to negate the painful consequences of being pervasively disconfirmed and confined by 
others.  Sharon is disclosed in the narrative as the participant’s attempt to concretely 
disconnect from her history and awaken a new aspect of her self, which is seen as 
assuming a dominant position in terms of her experience of self.   
“For the old Adrienne is dead, and passed and gone.” 
In this statement we see the powerful severance of Adrienne, as an aspect of 
personality, from the participant’s perception of self.  With the emergence of Sharon a 
“rejuvenated” self was described.  Descriptions of Sharon were essentially sparse, 
concrete and undeviating.  The following quotes, taken from the written data provided, 
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will give the reader a sense of the rigidly boundaried nature of Sharon’s perception of 
herself:  
“Sharon – Is a fighter and a go-getter.  One happy content eccentric person. 
Sharon – Loves to be happy, eccentric and jovial without putting on a front.   
Sharon – Strength.  Strong person who can face the world and all things. 
Sharon – The strong survivor 
Sharon – Has always been eccentric for this is my character trademark.  
Sharon – Is a strong willed person who never gives up whatever the cost. 
Adrienne is a person who perseveres and is a go-getter and enjoys life.  She 
finds it hard when she’s around family members because she loves to be 
Sharon, who is eccentric and jovial and happy and enjoys life.” 
In these statements we see an unbending perception of self, defined by determination 
and perseverance on the one hand, and eccentricity and joviality on the other.   
4.2.2  They make me live as Adrienne: Resisting being-for-others  
 This section will emerge as a narrative exposition of the core theme which 
emerged through reading of the data.  As has been described in the previous section, 
the participant’s perception of self is defined by a pronounced descriptive singularity.  In 
this sense we see the narration of Sharon as someone who is eccentric and 
perseverant.  These two qualities were disclosed as dominant in terms of the 
participant’s description of herself, and emerged repeatedly throughout the interview 
process and in the written data.  Eccentricity and perseverance emerged somewhat 
ambiguously as qualities embodied specifically by Sharon, who is described as having 
emerged out of Adrienne.  Sharon’s emergence is seen as a way of helping Adrienne to 
cope with her disconfirming and at times punitive family system.  As can be seen in the 
following statement, Sharon assumes a position of dominance in relation to Adrienne, 
who becomes essentially annihilated in the process. 
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“For the old Adrienne is dead and passed and gone and I have forgiven the 
family but that pain will still be like an open wound that needs healing.” 
Importantly, this annihilation of Adrienne, spoken of metaphorically here, was enacted 
concretely when the participant, at thirteen years of age, attempted suicide.   
The participant spoke with vigorous frustration of the difficulty which she endures 
as a result of people disallowing the emergence of Sharon.  She expressed a profound 
difficulty tolerating the notion that others in her social environment want to reawaken 
Adrienne and disconfirm Sharon.  She articulated this difficulty in the following 
statement, speaking with specific reference to her mother.  In this quotation the 
participant spoke of the fact that her mother refuses to call her by her new name, 
Sharon, and insists on calling her Adrienne. 
“S – I feel hurt.  Because she doesn’t care, she doesn’t understand that’s who I 
am.  And she’s never really understood me, and my individuality and 
independence and perseverance.  She would rather take it away from me than 
let me live my own life? 
R – The life that Sharon is living? 
S – Yes. 
R – She wants to take that life away? 
S – And make me live as Adrienne.” 
 In contrast to the experience of being denied her emergence as a rejuvenated 
Sharon, the participant spoke of her joy at having this new, eccentric and perseverant 
aspect of herself affirmed by others: 
“R – And what does it mean to you that they call you Sharon? 
S – I feel happy.  I feel like rejuvenated and very jovial.”  
In this we can see the participant’s experience of relationships which confirm her 
eccentric and perseverant Sharon-ness as being positive relationships, and those which 
attempt to reawaken Adrienne as negative relationships.  This central element of 
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Sharon’s intersubjective experience was reflected variously throughout her expressions 
in the data collection process, and is tied with a number of related themes.  As has been 
noted, Sharon described a difficulty with tolerating ambiguity in interpersonal exchange.  
In this sense she is seen as presenting herself to the other as Sharon, and described 
feeling angered and frustrated by the other’s insistence on her being-Adrienne.  The 
assertion of Sharon in interpersonal relationships is also seen in relation to the 
participant’s fairly rigid expectations regarding how others should relate to her.  As has 
been noted, she described firm expectations regarding how others should be-in-relation, 
and described feeling angered and frustrated when others do not conform to these 
expectations.  In this sense she is seen as having a defined conception of how people 
should relate to Sharon, and becomes angered when they relate to Adrienne instead, 
and make her “live as Adrienne”.  It can be seen that the participant is therefore acutely 
aware of her own being-for-others, and resists, sometimes aggressively, being-for-others 
in a way which does not conform with her expectations.   
Sharon experiences being-for-the-other in a way which she feels they want her to 
be - being-as-Adrienne for example - as a fairly self-destructive experience.  Importantly, 
in terms of the discussion to follow, this experience can be seen as disintegrative.  As 
can be seen in the quotation to follow, Sharon experiences a sense of being broken 
down when pressured into being-as-Adrienne, and feels a need to rebuild herself as 
Sharon when such interactions come to an end. 
“I’ve kind of got to step back and put on the mask and be who they want me to 
be. 
It means that I have to delve down deep into myself, and when I’m with the past 
people that I was friends with I have to go back and I have to bring up everything 
that I did around them.  And then I have to spend time with them in that moment 
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trying to be who they want me to be and not who I want to be.  So when I leave 
spending time with them I’ve got to build myself back up again. 
In this statement can be seen the profound discomfort which the participant experiences 
in having to be-in-relation-to-others in a way which does not concur with her definitive 
Sharon-ness. 
4.2.3  It’s kind of hard to get a conversation going 
 The final emergent theme, which needs to be commented on briefly, is Sharon’s 
difficulty communicating with others.  Sharon expressed a difficulty coming to know 
others, and suggested that she finds the process of starting a conversation very 
challenging.  She related this difficulty firstly to her own need, when engaging with 
others, to maintain a degree of guardedness and defensiveness, which she described as 
“putting up walls”.  As can be seen in the following quote, the maintenance of a guarded 
mode of interaction was connected with the self-doubt which has been spoken of. 
“When you’ve got those walls up on yourself, you keep questioning yourself.  You 
keep having things going on in your mind.  It’s like ‘Am I okay?  Is there anything 
wrong with me?  Have I said something wrong?’” 
Sharon’s difficulty with communicating was further related to a sense of 
awkwardness which she experiences when feeling that she does not know enough 
about a person in order to understand them, or to “know where they are coming from”.  
This not-knowing emerged as an element of Sharon’s experience which negatively 
impacted upon her capacity to interact with others.  I became aware of Sharon’s difficulty 
communicating through the interview process.  Sharon’s speech is fairly “woolly”, 
possibly subtly reflecting a degree of disordered thought.  This aspect may have made 
her experience of communicating her thoughts to me quite problematical. 
This chapter has served to narrate the intersubjective experience of the 
participant in a phenomenologically rigorous manner.  I shall now proceed with an 
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interpretation of the described experience, incorporating the insights drawn from the 
review of the literature.   
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CHAPTER 5 
DISCUSSION 
 This section will be presented as an interpretive fusion of the narrative of the 
participant’s experience with the understandings drawn from the review of the literature.  
The discussion will be structured according to the themes which emerged in the previous 
chapter.  All themes will be accounted for in section 5.1, with attention being focused on 
the core themes in section 5.2. 
5.1  Schematising schizophrenic intersubjectivity 
 In her descriptions of her world Sharon narrated her private and interpersonal 
world in terms of a variety of anchoring experiences, which emerged as the themes 
outlined in the previous chapter.  I would like to address each of these themes, exploring 
their connection with the literature review.  I would firstly like to examine Sharon’s 
experience of isolation, providing a phenomenological commentary on the disclosure of 
this experience.  Binswanger described schizophrenia as defined by an estrangement 
from intersubjectivity, and a disconnection from ones own being-with.  In Sharon’s 
narrative this sense of intersubjective detachment was connected with a belief that 
others are unable to empathise with her, and cannot understand her.  This experience 
can be seen in relation to three propositions stated in the literature.  Firstly, the reader 
will recall the exposition of Van den Berg’s account of schizophrenia as shaped largely 
by the individual’s felt sense of their own incommunicability.  Sharon spoke of her 
difficulty communicating with others, and her feeling that others are unable to “grasp her 
meaning”.  The experience of being unable to communicate, isolating in itself, is seen 
secondly in relation to the Barham’s (1993) suggestion that the capacity to convey ones 
identity through a sharable narrative is largely constitutive of an individual’s 
intersubjective experience.  Sharon’s difficulty communicating is seen as being isolating 
insofar as she experiences her self-narrative as inexpressible, and is thereby “stranded” 
 66 
in incommunicability.  Sharon’s isolation can be seen thirdly in relation to Scheff’s (1973) 
and Sullivan’s (1989) recognition of the exchange of emotional tone between mother and 
infant as central to both the individual’s experience of intersubjectivity as well as their 
sense of empathic responsiveness.  Sharon’s experience of abandonment in her 
formative relational matrix can be seen as impacting upon her sense of perennial 
estrangement from the other. 
 Sharon’s experience of doubt, both as a subjective and intersubjective 
experience, was variously described in the previous chapter.  As I understand it, 
Sharon’s self-doubt can be seen as having emerged out of a disconfirming, non-
reciprocal and disengaged relational matrix.  Apart from Sharon’s doubting herself 
interpersonally, she is also seen to manifest a degree of doubt in the veracity of her 
existence and her identity.   “Who am I in this time?” she asks.  An understanding of 
subjectivity as structured through interpersonal engagement was proposed in the 
literature review.  Sartre (1943) spoke of the “mutual gaze”, which implies the co-
constitution of self and world through meeting.  Buber (1970) posited the I-Thou 
relationship, in which he described mutual and reciprocal relatedness between self and 
other as being a condition which enabled the emergence of the self.  Buber further 
spoke of the self’s need to be recognised and confirmed by the other.  Such 
confirmation, Buber suggested, allows for the self’s constitution of itself as an identity.  
Further to this, we note Laing’s (1961) suggestion that disconfirmation of the self is a 
destructive and inhibiting interpersonal process, and one which could effect psychotic 
disintegration.  In light of these theorists’ propositions, Sharon’s narrative describes her 
experience of a perennial lack of reciprocity in relationships, a feeling of being ultimately 
unheard by the other, and a sense of being unseen, and even having her existence 
denied, throughout her life in her family.  In this experience, it is suggested, we can see 
the birthplace of Sharon’s experience of self-doubt.  Further to this, Sharon’s feeling of 
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being unable to communicate effectively with others is seen as contributing to her feeling 
of doubt.  Sullivan (1964) described the primacy of language as an attempt by the 
individual to attain a sense of ontological security.  In this sense language, as the 
conveyor of an individual’s narrative of self, emerges as that which enables the self to 
constitute and present itself in the presence of the other.  As such, language enables the 
emergence of self.  Sharon’s feeling of being unable to “language” her world in such a 
way that others will understand her is seen as further contributing to her feeling of self-
doubt.  Insofar as she feels unable to language herself effectively, it is suggested, 
Sharon may feel unable to constitute her identity through language, and this may be 
seen in relation to her self-doubt.   
Sharon’s experience of her interpersonal relationships as lacking reciprocity was 
one which came to the thematic foreground in my reading of the data.  This experience 
is seen as tightly bound with Sharon’s sense of self-doubt.  Engaging in a reciprocal 
human space, as proposed in the review of the literature, emerges as an ontological 
imperative for the emergence of the self within a shared social world.  Sharon’s felt lack 
of reciprocation in engagements is posited as limiting her emergence as a self, as well 
as limiting her capacity to engage with others.   
 This section has served as a discussion of Sharon’s experience of isolation, self-
doubt, incommunicability and lack of reciprocity in relationships.  These experiences are 
presented thematically as being significant but not central to Sharon’s narrative.  It is 
now necessary to proceed with an account of the central themes which were disclosed 
in the interpretation of data.  As will be noted, certain peripheral themes, which have not 
yet been discussed, will emerge in the following section due to their being related to the 
central themes.   
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5.2  Sharon, Adrienne and dialogism  
 In this section I intend to explore and discuss the participant’s narration of self in 
terms of the impact of that narration on her intersubjective experience.  I shall approach 
this aspect of her experience firstly in terms of her self-perception, providing a theoretical 
understanding of the emergence of Sharon as a mode of being-in-the-world.  I shall then 
proceed with a discussion, bound in the theory and results, of Sharon’s disclosure as a 
being-with, commenting on her being-with-the-other as a person with schizophrenia.    
5.2.1  Severance and rejuvenation: The disclosure of the monologal self 
 As was seen in the narration of the participant’s experience in the previous 
chapter, her perception of self has come to be markedly defined by the emergence of a 
way of being defined by being-strong, being-perseverant, being-jovial and being-
eccentric.  The participant expressed her Sharon-ness quite firmly in terms of these 
qualities.  As was noted, Sharon, as a mode of being-in-the-world, emerged as a way of 
helping Adrienne cope with the difficulties she endured as a member of a confining and 
disconfirming family system.  In this sense Sharon can be seen as a defensive self-
structure, who emerged to protect Adrienne from the intersubjective experience of being-
dominated, being-abused, being-placid and being-confined, which appeared central to 
the participant’s experience of herself as Adrienne.  The participant spoke of the 
emergence of Sharon as a rejuvenation of herself.  This making-new was noted in 
relation to the participant’s expression of the Adrienne mode of being-in-the-world as 
being “dead”.  In this we see the essential annihilation of Adrienne, the severance of 
Sharon from Adrienne, and the continuation of Sharon as the preferred mode of being.  I 
intend to frame this severance and rejuvenation firstly in terms of the participant’s 
communication of self-perception.  In this sense it is the intention firstly to focus on how 
the participant narrates her being-in-the-world, understood in connection with the 
theoretical framework provided. 
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 As has been suggested by the hermeneutic phenomenologists cited in the 
literature review, an individual’s narrative emerges as a life-text which locates the 
individual historically, and provides a world-related embeddedness (Rulf, 2003).  As 
seen in Gadamer’s notion that language manifests historicity, and Heidegger’s 
description of “thrownness”, the individual’s narration of self conveys that individual’s 
past and present embeddedness in a shared world (Moran, 2000).  Sharon’s narrative, 
in relation to this, can be understood as a communication of her attempt to disembed 
herself historically.  The annihilation of Adrienne is grasped thematically as a rejection of 
historicity, and therefore simultaneously a rejection of the interpersonal and intrapsychic 
narrative which that historicity makes manifest.  Sharon’s languaging of herself is 
therefore seen both as a disconnection from her history and a pronouncement of the 
emergence of a rejuvenated and dominant way of being, that is, being-in-the-mode-of-
Sharon.  In this can be seen the communication of a life-text, to use Todorov’s words, 
which is singular and predominant, as opposed to multiple and dialogical.  Sharon can 
therefore be seen as the participant’s expression of a monologal self, which is tightly 
defined, and inflexibly expressed through her being-in-the-world.  Further to this, the 
participant’s monologal self is seen phenomenologically as an assertion of her being-in-
the-present, a severance of her historical self, and a consequent attempt, through her 
inflexible languaging of Sharon, to disenable dialogue between present and historical 
selves.  In this can be seen the participant’s narration of self as defined by a self-
perception that is detached from the historical components self, and therefore a self-
perception that negates the “intrapersonal simultaneity” posited by the dialogical model 
of self (Holquist, 1990).   
 Having said that the participant narrates an essentially uni-polar self-perception, I 
realise the inconsistency which has emerged in this discussion.  Sharon did indeed 
narrate the disclosure of Adrienne in the written work which she provided.  As can be 
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seen in the appendix, Sharon composed a dialogue between the two aspects of her self, 
Sharon and Adrienne.  However, as can be seen in this dialogue, Adrienne is 
experienced as an unwanted and disconfirmed historical aspect of self, which Sharon 
essentially tries to rise above.  This rising-above, which unfolds as an annihilation of 
Adrienne, does emerge as dialogical insofar as it is an exchange between the two 
elements of self.  However the dialogue is limited to only one exchange, that of the 
annihilation of Adrienne through the rigid assertion and dominance of Sharon.  The 
emergence of Sharon as an inflexible and possibly even immutable way of being reflects 
Laing’s notion of the petrification of the schizophrenic self (Laing, 1965).  As the reader 
will recall, Laing proposed the petrified self as being in a position of ontological 
insecurity.  The concrete and unchanging disclosure of the petrified self can be seen in 
the dominance of Sharon, and the experience of ontological insecurity, it is suggested, 
can be seen in her pervasive self-doubt.   
 It is suggested that the participant’s narration of herself is a uni-polar expression 
of being-Sharon, which emerges intrapsychically as a resistance to those aspects of her 
being which do not correspond with her Sharon-ness.  It is now necessary to locate this 
experience in the theory of the dialogical self.  As the reader will recall, the theory 
proposes that the self is posited as polyphonic and plurivocal, and as constituted by a 
dialogical engagement between the various I-positions, which are defined as the distinct 
aspects of self (Lysaker & Lysaker, 2005; Holquist, 1990; Hermans & Kempen, 1993; 
Valsiner, 2002).  Further to this, Kimura (1982, 1984) described the self as engaged in a 
continual process of movement from one aspect of self to the next, in dialogical 
relationship with the changing intersubjective context.  Kimura described a 
phenomenological betweenness defined by a temporal motioning between self-positions, 
in which the individual, ever-changing, is nonetheless aware of a trans-temporal identity 
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and sameness.  In this sense, for Kimura, intersubjectivity instantiates the “I” as 
changing and yet always the same “I”.   
 In contrast to the proposition of self as inherently dialogical, we see the 
participant’s adamant narration and perception of herself as Sharon; unfluctuating, 
monologal, and resistant to intrapsychic dialogue.  It is now necessary to explore the 
participant’s intersubjective experience in relation to this.  How does Sharon relate to the 
other, and what is the nature of the impact which her undeviating Sharon-ness has on 
her intersubjective experience? 
5.2.2  Being-with in the mode of the monologal self: A defence against 
disintegration 
 In the previous section it was suggested that the participant narrates a perception 
of self that is largely defined by a severance of the historical aspects of herself, a 
negation of the existence of that self, and a resistance to intrapsychic dialogue with that 
aspect of self.  It is now necessary to shift the focus from the intrapsychic to the 
interpersonal.  The question will be asked, how does the participant’s intrapsychic 
negation of Adrienne, her rigid assertion of Sharon, and her consequent uni-polar 
perception and narration of self, enter her intersubjective experience?  In answering this 
question, certain themes which emerged in the analysis of the data will be discussed in 
relation to the theory of the dialogical self.     
 As was suggested in chapter 4, Sharon seems to emerge in interpersonal 
relationships in the mode of resisting-being-for-others.  Sharon expressed anger, 
frustration and pain at the notion that others make her “live as Adrienne”.  Wanting to 
assert the dominance of her Sharon-ness, that is, her perseverance, strength, 
eccentricity and joviality, Sharon feels that others try to depress this side of her, and 
instead call Adrienne forth.  It is firstly important to reiterate the participant’s experience 
of being-for-the-other-in-the-mode-of-Adrienne as one which threatens her with a sense 
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of disintegration.  As was described, Sharon expressed a sense of having to “build 
herself up” after being made to engage intersubjectively as Adrienne, for example in 
relation to her mother.  This experience of feared disintegration can be understood in 
relation to Lysaker and Lysaker’s (2005) proposition that the schizophrenic experience is 
partially defined by a feared fragmentation of self.  This fragmentation, suggest the 
authors, is disclosed as a disembedding of certain aspects of self from the individual’s 
historical narrative.  In the participant’s narrative we see the disembedding of Adrienne, 
and the fear of fragmentation if Adrienne is called forth in interactions with others.  
 As was suggested in the previous chapter, the participant resists being-for-
others-in the-mode-of-Adrienne.  As was revealed in her descriptions, Sharon dislikes, 
considers unworthy, and avoids interpersonal relationships which make her be-as-
Adrienne.  In this we can see an attempt to avoid dialogue between Adrienne and the 
other, and to promote dialogue between Sharon and the other.  The assertion of Sharon 
as the dominant mode of being and engaging can therefore be seen intrapsychically and 
intersubjectively.  Monologue is seen to replace polyphony and multivoicedness on an 
internal and inter-relational level.   
Certain themes emerged in the presentation of results, which can be more clearly 
understood in relation to the notion of monologue as characterising Sharon’s being and 
relating.  Firstly, and perhaps most obviously, Sharon’s experience was seen as defined 
partially by an intolerance of ambiguity in terms of being and relating.  As has been 
described, the participant revealed a desire to avoid being-in-relation-to-the-other-in-the-
mode-of-Adrienne.  This intolerance of ambiguity can be seen firstly in relation to 
Sharon’s rigid perception of self, which was disclosed through the sparse narration of 
her Sharon-ness.  I refer the reader to Sharon’s evocative description of herself as a 
stretched jelly baby, feeling the too complicated demands of an intersubjective context, 
which tries to make her engage beyond the boundaries of her Sharon-ness.  This 
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intolerance can be further seen in relation to the participant’s apportioning of value to 
relationships.  For Sharon worthy relationships, to which she feels drawn, are those 
which affirm her Sharon-ness, and unworthy relationships, which repel her, are those 
which affirm her Adrienne-ness.  In this sense we can see how Sharon may avoid 
interpersonal contexts which require that she engage from an I-position that is contrary 
to her uni-polar Sharon-ness.   
Lysaker and Lysaker (2005) suggest that being-with others necessitates internal 
dialogue between the various I-positions, which constitute the dialogical self.  For 
individuals with schizophrenia, it is suggested, the sustenance of internal dialogue 
between I-positions is both interpersonally and intrapsychically threatening.  The 
interpersonal threat, propose the authors, relates firstly to a subjective awareness of 
being-invaded by the other, and secondly to a fear of disintegration of the self (ibid.).  
Sharon spoke of this sense of being probed and invaded in her narrative.  This sense of 
invasion was coupled with an experience of having something taken out of her by the 
invasive other.  More solidly expressed was Sharon’s sense of a feared fragmentation 
and disintegration, internally and intersubjectively.  As the reader will recall, Sharon 
described quite extensively her experience of having to be cautious in relationships.  
She spoke variously of “walking on egg-shells” and “hopping on blocks of ice”; fearing 
always the breakage of the shell or the ice.  This caution emerged variously as Sharon’s 
need to be cautious in relation to the other so as not to hurt them, and the other’s need 
to be cautious so as to avoid disruption in relation to Sharon.  Sharon’s caution is further 
conceptualised here in relation to her intolerance of ambiguity.  The broken eggshell, it is 
posited, reflects partially a state of interpersonal ambiguity, which demands of Sharon 
that she engage dialogically.  Dialogical engagement would require of Sharon that she 
reveal herself, interpersonally and intrapsychically, beyond the boundaries of her 
Sharon-ness, which as we have seen, is a painful and threatening experience for her. It 
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is suggested that this caution can be conceptualised as similar to Lysaker and Lysaker’s 
(2005) notion of a feared fragmentation and disintegration of self as defining 
schizophrenic intersubjectivity.   
It has been suggested by Parnas and Handest (2003) that the schizophrenic 
experience is partially characterised by a degree of narrative incoherence, a sense of 
confusion regarding ones identity, and a feared loss of ownership of self in interactions 
with the other.  The notion of narrative incoherence has been explored in terms of 
Sharon’s felt inability to communicate an interpretable narrative to the other, reflected in 
her feeling of being chronically misunderstood by the other.  Narrative incoherence is 
further seen here in relation to the threatening experience of being-disintegrated, and is 
considered in connection with Lysaker and Lysaker’s proposition that schizophrenic 
intersubjectivity is disclosed phenomenologically as being characterised by a feared 
fragmentation and breakage of the self.    
It is suggested that Sharon’s disintegration-anxiety, if we can call it that, is 
disclosed as the self-doubt which she narrated so powerfully in her question “Who am I 
in this time?”  This question was asked when Sharon found herself in an Adrienne-
affirming relationship, in which she experienced the disruption and breakage of her so 
rigidly asserted Sharon-ness.  In this expression of doubt we can see the fear of loss of 
identity which Stanghellini (in Lysaker et al, 2005) notes as being characteristic of the 
schizophrenic experience.  In this sense Sharon’s self-doubt is posited as being 
grounded in her awareness of the demands which intersubjective engagement places on 
her to dialogue beyond the “walls” of her Sharon-ness.  The unfolding of the monologal 
self has been described in relation to dialogical theory as a defensive construction of the 
self in response to a feared disintegration.  This disintegration is posited as a sense of 
loss of ownership of ones identity, and an awareness of incoherence and un-
interpretability as defining the personal narrative of the individual with schizophrenia.  It 
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is in this light then, that Sharon’s experience of self-doubt, her intolerance of 
interpersonal ambiguity, her sense of incapacity to communicate herself to the other, 
and her need to be cautious in interpersonal relationships, are grasped as being related 
to a feared disintegration connected with the interruption of the monologal self that is 
Sharon.     
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
 The aim of this research project was to narrate a phenomenologically informed 
description of the intersubjective experience of one individual with schizophrenia.  
Schizophrenic intersubjectivity was explored in terms of the individual’s subjective 
experience of being-with, as that experience is impacted upon by being-in-the-world as 
an individual with schizophrenia.  A case study methodology was employed so as to 
provide a longitudinal and descriptively rich account of the felt experience of 
schizophrenic intersubjectivity.  Phenomenological research has devoted attention to 
exploring living with schizophrenia, however I felt that research into the intersubjective 
experience of individuals with schizophrenia had been given less attention, hence the 
motivation for this work.  Interest in the theory of the dialogical model of self prompted 
me to explore the fusion of this model with phenomenological research into 
schizophrenic experience.  I considered it vital to explore the nature of schizophrenic 
intersubjectivity, as this could enrich the understanding of mental health practitioners, as 
well as facilitate psychologists’ and psychotherapists’ approaches to working in the 
therapeutic relationship with an individual with schizophrenia.   
6.1  A sketching of the results 
  The participant’s experience of interpersonal relationships, as explored with 
specific reference to her experience after being diagnosed with schizophrenia, appears 
to be defined by the following core themes: Sharon experiences a need to be cautious in 
relationships, both so as to avoid hurting others, and so as to avoid her own intrapsychic 
disruption.  She expressed a pervasive sense of self-doubt, which emerged firstly as her 
sense of confusion and insecurity as to whether she is relating to others in the right way.  
She experiences, perhaps more significantly, a degree of existential doubt, in which she 
questions the veracity of her own identity, and narrates a sense of confusion regarding 
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who she is within a specific relational context.  Central to her experience of being-with-
others was Sharon’s difficulty with tolerating ambiguity.  In this sense she expressed 
quite concretely defined notions regarding how she, as well as the other, should relate in 
interactions.  When others do not relate to her in this manner she experiences a sense 
of being unable to tolerate the demands placed on her by the intersubjective context.  
One of the primary difficulties which Sharon described was her experience of being 
unable to communicate herself effectively to the other, and a sense of being chronically 
misunderstood and unheard by the other.  This experience was connected with the 
experience of isolation and intersubjective detachment which arose in Sharon’s 
narrative.  Further to this, Sharon described her sense that others, specifically those who 
are not mentally ill, cannot possibly empathise with her, and cannot grasp the essence of 
her experience.  Sharon’s experience of close relationships was largely defined by a 
sense of a lack of reciprocity on the part of the other.  She described feeling that she 
gave too much in relationships, and received little in return.    
Central to the participant’s intrapsychic and intersubjective experience was the 
emergence of an aspect of her self, Sharon, which she narrated as an attempt to 
strengthen and aid the historical aspect of her self, Adrienne.  Adrienne was described 
as placid and victimised, and Sharon as perseverant, strong and jovial.  Sharon’s voice 
emerged in the participant’s narrative of experience as being thoroughly dominating.  
Sharon emerged as the participant’s preferred mode of being-in-the-world, and she was 
seen to resist powerfully being-in-the-world in the mode of Adrienne.   
The emergence of Sharon both intrapsychically and intersubjectively was 
considered in this project in relation to the theory of dialogical self.  This theory proposes 
self as being constituted variously by multiple voices, understood as independent and 
distinct.  It is suggested that the schizophrenic experience is largely characterised by the 
individual’s incapacity to tolerate the intrapsychic dialogue which the multiplicity of I-
 78 
positions implies.  For individuals with schizophrenia the experience of the dialogical self 
threatens the individual with the possibility of their own disintegration.  Dialogical theory 
proposes that this disintegration emerges in one of two ways.  Either individuals with 
schizophrenia experience internal cacophony, in which the multiple selves are seen to 
speak in disordered simultaneity, with the effect that individuals experience themselves 
as fragmented.  The other possibility put forward by dialogical theory is that of 
monologue.  In this instance the individual with schizophrenia is seen to defensively 
resist disintegration through concretely asserting the dominance of one or a few self-
positions.  It is this monologal being-in-the-world which can be seen in the participant’s 
internal and interpersonal experience.  Sharon is immutable, firm, and resistant to being-
with-the-other in a way which does not fit within the boundaries of her Sharon-ness.  
6.2  Methodological issues 
 In terms of the reliability and validity of this project, a few possible criticisms need 
to be addressed.  Firstly, the adoption of a case study method may be considered as 
providing insufficiently for the data collection.  It must be considered however, that the 
intention of this work was focused on describing the immediate lived experience of an 
individual in terms of that individual’s intersubjective experience.  The richness of the 
data gathered enabled a phenomenologically rigorous description of the experience 
being explored.   
 Another potential criticism may relate to the fact that the participant suffered from 
a particular subtype of schizophrenia, that is, Paranoid Schizophrenia.  I acknowledge 
that this may render the findings of this study more applicable to individuals with 
paranoid schizophrenia.  A comparative study may therefore be necessary, exploring the 
nature of the intersubjective experience of individuals diagnosed with the others 
schizophrenia subtypes.   
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 As noted, I approached the participant to invite her to participate in the study 
following her discharge from a psychiatric hospital. It may be suggested that this is 
ethically insensitive insofar as the participant may have been in a somewhat weakened 
psychological state.  However I was very careful in my approach to the participant.  She 
had been out of hospital for two months before being approached.  She had also been 
contained in a weekly therapy, and so her mental state was considered robust enough to 
engage actively with the research process.  
 In terms of phenomenological hermeneutic methodology, it may be suggested 
that the infusion of the researcher’s horizons within the research process may infiltrate to 
too great an extent the participant’s narrative, thus clouding the interpretation.  However, 
it is noted that I acknowledged and made transparent the kinds of knowledges which 
may have impacted on my reading of the data.  As a work which is not intended as 
purely phenomenological, it is suggested that this integration of the researcher’s 
horizons does not weaken the phenomenological rigour of this work.  
6.3  Recommendations for future research 
As has been suggested, it may be necessary to engage in a phenomenologically 
informed exploration into the possible differences which may be realised in terms of the 
intersubjective experience of individuals diagnosed with different subtypes of 
schizophrenic illness.  Further to this, the experience of children and older people 
diagnosed with psychotic disorders needs to be explored.  Research into therapeutic 
strategies in the aid of individuals with schizophrenia could possibly consider this 
research as a prompt towards employing the dialogical model therapeutically.  In this 
sense it may be necessary to focus on the individual’s fear of disintegration, and 
consequent experience of cacophony or monologue.  This experience could be worked 
with therapeutically by providing the individual with possibilities to develop rejuvenated 
narratives that move beyond the focus on disintegration.   
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The theory of the dialogical self, so central to this research, could also be applied 
to exploring others pathologies, most notably Dissociative Disorders.  Dissociative 
Identity Disorder particularly seems to be characterised by a pathological fracturing of 
self, in which the various self–positions emerge in total disengagement from one 
another.  A phenomenologically informed inquiry into the nature of this experience could 
be particularly informative.  The Personality Disorders, as defined largely by relational 
difficulties, could also be researched in terms of such individual’s being-with-others in 
relation to living as a dialogical self.  
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Appendix A – Example of an interview transcript 
 
The interview, which has been transcribed faithfully according to its contents, 
occurred in the researcher’s office on the 2nd
 
 of June, and lasted for 50 minutes.  The 
letter “B” refers to the researcher, and the letter “S” to the participant who has been 
given the name Sharon.   
1) 
B – I suppose that now that you know what this is about … you know what area of your 
world we are looking at, I’ll just give it to you to go wild with. 
Interview 5 
S – Ok, um, the thing is is I’ve had no contact with my mother for a short while, and I 
was getting really stressed and despondent because I feel it’s important to keep that 
communication open.  And I contacted her this week.  I think it was on Monday just to 
chat to her, because I really want to go home.  And I just feel it would be lovely to spend 
some time with her so that I could discuss a few issues with her.  And so I’m going home 
tomorrow with her.  Just for the day.   
B – Tell me about the feeling of being distressed at having no contact with her.   
S – You kind of feel like left out.  You just feel you’re not part of the picture.  It’s like she 
always paints this picture of hers that she feels is important and sometimes she leaves 
other people out that she feels aren’t relevant to her life.  And it’s just really hard to try 
and cope with that.   
B – Can you describe feeling left out.  Feeling out of the picture.  
S – You feel despondent.  You feel like you’re not really part of the family.  You feel like 
there’s nothing you can do to prove yourself, and even though you try it doesn’t really 
help. 
B – There’s nothing you can do to prove yourself.  Can you describe what that feels like 
for you? 
S – Um, you feel very uncomfortable in a way that you don’t know what to do or how to 
communicate with her.  So she can carry on phoning you and chatting to you and it’s like 
you’ve got to start from the beginning again.  You’ve got to bring out those 
communicating mechanisms, so that it’s easier to work with her. 
B – I’m hearing how it’s a difficult experience for you, there’s kind of a wall between you 
two and you’re not quite sure how to jump it.  What makes it difficult for you, kind of 
bridging the gap between you and her?   
S – Um, I think sometimes its, she’s a very kind of shallow person and I feel that she 
wants me to stoop down to her level, to be the kind of person that she would like me to 
be, and I don’t feel like doing that because I’m a strong, courageous, independent 
person, and I think if I try and go down to meet her, then it will be ok but it will be hard for 
me because I’m not that type of person.   
B – Ok, so what I’m hearing is two sides of the story.  I’m hearing ambiguity.  Which is 
important, we all have ambiguous experiences.  What I’m hearing from you is, on the 
one hand “There’s been no contact and I find that distressing.  I find that I have needed 
the contact.”   
S – Ja 
B – On the other hand, there’s the feeling of “I won’t bridge the gap because I won’t 
stoop to her level because I’m courageous and independent.”  They’re kind of different 
energies?  Am I getting this? 
S – Yes, they are 
B – How does this feel for you?  How do you understand this? 
S – It’s very like difficult.  Because you don’t know which side to stand on.  And you can’t 
be in between.  You’ve got to stand on one side or the other.  It’s like you’re being 
pulled.  It’s like a monkey that’s eating a jelly baby, and you’re just stretching.  You’ve 
just got to like keep on stretching. 
B – In relation to your mother, you’ve got to stand on one side or the other.  You have to 
stand on one side or the other.  You can’t be in between.  What does that mean?  How 
do you live that?  Can you give me an experience? 
S – It’s just very like one-sided, and there’s always been conflict, even since I’ve been 
inside the hospital.  Since I got out she didn’t want to discuss anything regarding me or 
why I was here, or any one of those things.  So it was like very hard to even have a 
decent conversation, and it’s difficult because I don’t know where she stands in the 
situation.  And as soon as I know where she stands then it will be easier to break that 
conflict.   
B – Um, you experience in yourself a kind of two-sidedness in terms of how you relate to 
her.  It’s difficult to navigate that two-sidedness.  It’s difficult to go between it.  And you 
don’t know where she stands.  What do you mean, “where she stands”.  How would you 
describe “where she stands”, and your confusion about it? 
S – It would be easier for me to understand her grasp and her meaning, and where she’s 
coming from so I can relate to her a lot easier.  Instead of having friction.  And no 
communication or understanding.   
B – What does it feel like that there is no understanding? 
S – It’s painful.  Because it’s like they don’t understand so therefore they don’t care and 
then they can’t put themselves in my shoes and try and feel what it would be like just for 
a day or two.  And not having anyone there just to talk to and communicate with and 
spend some time with.  Because she’s pushing me so far away, that’s it’s really difficult 
to at least try and communicate with her, and chat to her on a normal level.   
B – What’s a normal level? 
S – Just like everyday level.  Like life and friendship, how mother and daughters usually 
communicate.  Just basic things you know.  Ja.  
B – I have a sense today that you’re kind of feeling quite, I don’t know if it’s feeling of 
being at peace, or just feeling very tired.  A sense of being quite restful. 
S – I am. Cause I went through a really hard time on Tuesday, with a friend of mine in 
the house that I’m staying in.  Um, he hasn’t been working for a while so he’s been 
borrowing money from me.  And the money he borrows he takes and goes to drink.  And 
on Tuesday at three o’clock we went into town and he bought something to drink and 
then I bought some food for myself and we came back.  Started drinking.  Then he went 
out again to go get some food, so he took some more money, and then he came back 
and I asked him to get me a chocolate and he didn’t.  And I went into his room and he 
was passed out on the bed.  And he was in tears, he was so heart sore and he had a 
blade.  And he was with this blade and he was sitting there cutting himself.  He said no 
he can’t live.  He doesn’t want to live anymore.  He’s just so painful and he doesn’t know 
why he’s painful.  Now I had to sit there and console with him and chat to him, and talk 
to him.  And it just took me so far back that I also felt like doing exactly the same.  Not 
cutting myself, but just disappearing you know?  Just like leaving this earth.  Because it’s 
just so hard, and there like, there are people that I can relate to.  That I can talk to you 
know.  And then at 11 o’clock he went out again, and he came back at half past three.  
And he started ringing the doorbell.  And he woke everyone else in the house up.  So 
that’s just destroyed that.  I just feel that I can’t be there for him if I’m not strong enough 
myself.  And the thing is I have to spend so much time talking to him and like brining him 
up, that I myself lose that strength that I’ve gained.  And I just like feel so less, and so 
despondent and so unhappy and … it’s really hard. 
B – So you feel brought down by his sadness. 
S – Yes 
B – How do you understand that?  What does that feel like? 
S – It feels uncomfortable, because you constantly have to think that there are many 
special things in life that are important to you, and there are reasons for all of us to be 
alive.  And there are special gifts and things that we find in ourselves to keep going.  And 
just persevere through each day no matter how hard it is.  You just need to carry on. 
B – How do you experience the demands he places on you?  His needs. 
S – They’re very strong and overbearing.  I try be there for him, and then I’m there for 
him and then the next day it’s like it’s never happened you know.  I try not to be in his 
presence.  And I try not spend as much time with him as I have, but it’s just so hard.  
You’re living in the same house with the same person, and you there the whole time.  
And you really would like someone to speak to, but he’s there but you don’t know if you 
want to converse with him because it’s just so difficult.   
B – What does that experience feel like?  When you feel the need for someone but 
someone isn’t there?   
S – You feel very alone.  You feel very stranded.  Like it would be lovely to have 
someone to talk to, but the only person I can talk to at the moment is prayer and the 
bible because that’s all I’ve got at the moment.  
B – What do you mean stranded? 
S – Like left alone.  To fend for yourself.  And there’s just so many things that I could be 
doing.  But it’s just so difficult to have a conversation with someone who hasn’t been in 
my situation.  And I would just like to have some friends that I could discuss a few things 
with, that would help clear my conscience.  Or help me be happy.  Or help me be … 
understand me and my situation.  That they can give me some advice to help me.   
B – You want some friends to help you be happy.  Can you tell me about that?  
S – Well, friends are always there for each other through hard times and through good 
times.  And the thing is, is a friend is important because you support each other through 
everything.  And through the friends that I had inside here … they were very helpful and 
really strong.  Because I could sit down and discuss anything with them and they’ll be 
able to say like look here do this, or rather do that, or, maybe do it that way. And now the 
friends that I had before I came in.  There’s only one or two really good friends, but I 
hardly see them, because they’re so busy working and doing all of those things.  So I 
suppose you have to be your own friend, you know.  You need to help yourself through 
those kind of situations.  You have to answer your own questions.   
B – Be your own friend.  That implies a relationship with yourself, which we certainly all 
have.  How would you describe your relationship with yourself?   
S – It’s ok at the moment.  It’s not as good as it was. 
B – What was it like when it was good? 
S – I was very happy, and I loved who I was, and I wouldn’t let anyone shout me down.  
And now it’s kind of a little bit less than what it was because I just feel that because of 
the no communication with my mother and sister and not have many friends that I can 
turn to, it’s just really difficult to say “what am I worth?”  Who am I?  What is my weight in 
gold?  Who am I as a person to keep questioning myself for not loving who I am?  And 
only through understanding and loving who you are then you’ll be fine.   
B – You spoke of the difference in your relationships with the people who you’ve met in 
the hospital.  And outside. 
S – Yes 
B – You’ve spoken about it quite often.  You’ve sort of touched on it gently.  Can you 
delve into it now?  Kind of explore it.   
S – Ja.  Um, the people that you connect with in the hospital are really special people.  
And they’re really caring and understanding, because you lived with each other so much, 
and you’re in each other’s space, and you go through the same sort of things and you’re 
always there for each other, and you chat to each other, and you discuss your difficult 
times, and you all went through the same abusive hard times.  So one leans on the 
other, it’s like dominoes.  One follows off the other.  And lift someone up if they’re sad, 
and sing a song with someone if they’re unhappy.  But the other friends, the ones that I 
had before, can’t understand what it feels like to have been in an institution where there 
have been so many doctors pushing needles in you and making you drink certain drugs 
and making sure you’re sleeping and making sure that you’re sane and not sane and 
asking 120 questions all the time.  They just don’t seem to understand that sometimes 
it’s hard, but you need those friends to help you.  But they have just dropped me, so I 
can’t find a reason to continue a friendship with them if they don’t care or even 
understand or grasp the concept of what it was like inside.   
B – Can you describe what it was like to be dropped?  You said they just dropped you. 
S – Ja, you feel very worthless to them.  Because you feel that you have been friends 
with them for like so long, and they have always been there when you’ve needed them.  
And now through the two months that I was away from them they just, they will come 
and visit me.  But I was going through so many things.  Issues which I needed to sort out 
myself, but then they came to visit me. I couldn’t give as much of myself to them as I 
would have liked to because I was trying to deal with those issues at the time.  And they, 
I think they found it just a bit uncomfortable coming to visit me, because they said that I 
wasn’t the person they would have liked to have come and seen.  I was always like 
shouting at them and unhappy towards them, and turning them away.  But I was turning 
them away for a reason because I didn’t want to see them because of how much they 
had hurt me and because of how unhappy I was sometimes in their presence.   
It’s like really hard, and I’m still finding it hard trying to get understanding through to like 
my mother and my sister.  And just hoping that I can find some really good friends that 
are there for me.   
B – What’s a really good friend? 
S – Someone who is there when I need to have someone to talk to just for some advice 
or some help.  And someone to have coffee with and to go to the movies with and just 
sing songs to you know, and do jolly things together.  And all of those things.   
B – And at the moment, as you said, there’s a sense of feeling stranded. 
S – Yes 
B – How do you understand the experience of being mentally ill?  Of being called 
mentally ill.  Not in the hospital but outside.  What does that experience feel like to you? 
S – You feel like no-one cares because they’re just labelling you.  And it’s like we’re not 
going to spend time with her or chat to her because she’s schizophrenic or something 
shocking like that. (Sharon becomes tearful at this point) 
……………………………………. 
B – So you imagine people are having the thought “She’s schizophrenic, I’m not going to 
hang around” 
S – Ja.   
B – How does that feel for you? 
S – You feel hurt because there are people who are there for you, but now there’s no-
one.   
B – How do people relate to a schizophrenic person? 
S – They like constantly, with me, I feel that they constantly walking on egg-shells 
around me because they don’t want to upset me in a way that I will react. 
B – React how? 
S – React in a way because I’m unhappy about what they’ve said, or react in a way… 
B – They walk on eggshells around you.  What does that feel like?  To have people 
walking on eggshells around you?   
S – You feel uncomfortable, because you can’t just be who you want to be, and you just, 
you don’t know what to say, because between two people you don’t really want to upset 
each other.   
B  - What does it mean to walk on eggshells? 
S – It means you’ve got to tread carefully.  In a way that between two people you don’t 
really want to upset each other.  So you’ve got to keep walking on thin ice.  And if it 
breaks then it breaks. 
B  - So in between you and one other person, some other person, you have to be careful 
on how you are with them, and part of the consciousness of having to be careful comes 
through, “they are aware that I am schizophrenic”.  And there’s a sense of having to 
tread very lightly so as to not cause any kind of disturbance.  What kind of thing would 
cause a disturbance, do you imagine?  What would cause the eggshell to break? 
S – I think it would be like delving deeper into the illness without asking me properly.  Or 
speaking about it behind my back, instead of coming straight to me.  Or gossiping about 
it with friends.  Instead of talking to it with me personally.   
B – So you see it as something that people might be gossiping about. 
S – Well they did when I was in the hospital 
B – What’s that like for you?  That experience, that people are debating your illness 
amongst themselves. 
S – It’s very hurtful.  Because I was in the hospital and all my sister’s friends knew about 
it, and the whole town knew about it, and like they would always come and visit me, but I 
knew when my sister came to visit me she didn’t come to visit me to see how I was, she 
came to get information out of me.  Like so that she could go back and discuss it with my 
mum, or some other friends.   
B – Let’s just take a little while to take the pressure off the moment.  I can see this is 
difficult emotionally.  So let’s just chill for a bit ok.   
S – Ok. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The presence of the following (…….…………………………) indicates a long silence in 
the interview process.  
 
 
 
Appendix B – Examples of written data provided by the participant 
 
The participant provided the researcher with written data of her own volition.  Two of five 
examples of written data are given in the appendix.  The two characters narrated in the 
role-play  were described by the participant as two distinct aspects of her personality.  
Please refer to the analysis of data in Chapter 4 for clarification of the emergence of 
these characters.   
 
1) 
Sharon: Strength, strong person who can face the world at all things. 
A role-play between my two names, of which one is my strongest, to begin with a 
new start 
Adrienne: Very heart and the achieve, a child never allowed to be one. 
Sharon: An adult who can be with a mixture of a child I was never allowed to be. 
Adrienne: Always had to prove myself around my family.  Could never cry around them. 
Sharon: The strong survivor who can keep up with what it is good in my life. 
Adrienne: Feel inferior around my family.  Always talk badly of me, have no respect for 
me.  No care of what I wanted in my life for me to enjoy to make me happy. 
Sharon: Always made the most out of each opportunity and each situation that can help 
for the better.  By volunteering and helping this has helped me become a whole person. 
Adrienne: Always belittled by family, superior environment.  Always had to prove myself 
to the world and to my family. 
Sharon: Not have to live in anyone’s shadow.  Life to live my own life, not having to 
answer to my family, sister or anyone else, for this time it’s for myself.  To live a special 
life of love. 
Adrienne: Never loved by my family.  Thought they could cover it up with food, or always 
talking around the situation.  Never accepted me for myself who I was, and never 
received love.  Family love or motherly love. 
Sharon: The lady who can face any situation.  Life to live to the fullest maximum ultimate 
of all situations.   
Adrienne: Voiced my opinion all the time of great times.  Always voiced where I am 
happy or not.  Never felt comfortable in my immediate family.  Always felt I had to prove 
myself.  Felt very uncomfortable around my father, because his beatings would scare 
me.  I felt like my family would aggravate my just to cause a reaction so that my father 
would beat, hit me! 
Sharon: Live in no-body’s shadow.  Live each day as a new day.  Love each other and 
most of all love myself for I am special and important.  Never given this love by my 
family, so I will give it to myself. 
Adrienne: Has special friends who I can trust and rely on.  For help and love.  Will look to 
these people for love. 
 
2) 
Adrienne: Always Cinderella, clean, work, get paid and eat. 
Role-play between both names 
Sharon: More free and a special independent person like my life I can live as I never was 
able to live when I was a child. 
Adrienne: Never have to live in my fear of being abused by my family anymore for my life 
is important right and I don’t think they will understand who I am.   
For the old Adrienne is dead and passed and gone and I have forgiven the family but 
that pain will still be like an open wound that needs healing.   
Sharon: This is the happiest and most well I have ever been.  I Abused alcohol and 
dagga just to keep the coping mechanisms going just to keep myself alive.  Never 
knowing that I could leave these bad habits and become more pure.  
Through working at group and the one and one with Bruce and all the groups have 
helped me through talking this has helped me get better. 
Adrienne: I would always keep my emotions inside for myself for I felt like a pressure 
cooker about to explode so I would do things to help me cope like set a dozen alarms 
outside my family’s room in England to say how much I hated them.  They never trusted 
or loved me as a child should receive love.  I always received it in other ways like food, 
clothes and soap.  
Sharon: Through all the bad my mother was the one I spent most of my time with in the 
divorce.  It was like I had to be her carbon copy. 
Adrienne: I could not just live and be happy, the way I have always persevered for all of 
the mother nature’s special things like the love of God’s creations.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(The researcher has not edited the written work provided by the participant in any way.) 
Appendix C – Example of themes emerging from raw data 
 
Feeling left out and unimportant 
Interview 5 
      B – Tell me about the feeling of being distressed at having no contact with her.   
S – You kind of feel like left out.  You just feel you’re not part of the picture.  It’s like she 
always paints this picture of hers that she feels is important and sometimes she leaves 
other people out that she feels aren’t relevant to her life.  And it’s just really hard to try 
and cope with that.   
 
Having to prove self to other 
B - Can you describe feeling left out?  Feeling out of the picture. 
S – You feel despondent.  You feel like you’re not really part of the family.  You feel like 
there’s nothing you can do to prove yourself, and even though you try it doesn’t really 
help. 
 
Resistant to changing self in such a way that self becomes like other – connected 
with an intolerance of ambiguity in terms of self-perception 
Um, I think sometimes its, she’s a very kind of shallow person and I feel that she wants 
me to stoop down to her level, to be the kind of person that she would like me to be, and 
I don’t feel like doing that because I’m a strong, courageous, independent person, and I 
think if I try and go down to meet her, then it will be ok but it will be hard for me because 
I’m not that type of person 
 
It’s very like difficult.  Because you don’t know which side to stand on.  And you can’t be 
in between.  You’ve got to stand on one side or the other.  It’s like you’re being pulled.  
It’s like a monkey that’s eating a jelly baby, and you’re just stretching.  You’ve just got to 
like keep on stretching. 
 
And he was with this blade and he was sitting there cutting himself.  He said no he can’t 
live.  He doesn’t want to live anymore.  He’s just so painful and he doesn’t know why 
he’s painful.  Now I had to sit there and console with him and chat to him, and talk to 
him.  and it just took me so far back that I also felt like doing exactly the same.  Not 
cutting myself, but just disappearing you know.  Just like leaving this earth.  Because it’s 
just so hard, and there like, there are people that I can relate to. 
 
I couldn’t give as much of myself to them as I would have liked to because I was trying to 
deal with those issues at the time.  And they, I think they found it just a bit uncomfortable 
coming to visit me, because they said that I wasn’t the person they would have liked to 
have come and seen 
 
Caution in interpersonal relationships 
B – How do people relate to a schizophrenic person? 
S – They like constantly, with me, I feel that they constantly walking on egg-shells 
around me because they don’t want to upset me in a way that I will react. 
B – React how? 
S – React in a way because I’m unhappy about what they’ve said, or react in a way… 
B – They walk on eggshells around you.  What does that feel like?  To have people 
walking on eggshells around you.   
S – You feel uncomfortable, because you can’t just be who you want to be, and you just, 
you don’t know what to say, because between two people you don’t really want to upset 
each other.   
B  - What does it mean to walk ion eggshells? 
S – It means you’ve got to tread carefully.  In a way that between two people you don’t 
really want to upset each other.  So you’ve got to keep walking on thin ice.  And if it 
breaks then it breaks. 
 
 
 
Feeling probed 
But the other friends, the ones that I had before, can’t understand what it feels like to 
have been in an institution where there have been so many doctors pushing needles in 
your and making you drink certain drugs and making sure you’re sleeping and making 
sure that you’re sane and not sane and asking 120 questions all the time. 
 
Rigid self-perception – courageous and dependent – connected with not wanting 
to be other than that, and feeling forced to be other than that by an other 
Um, I think sometimes its, she’s a very kind of shallow person and I feel that she wants 
me to stoop down to her level, to be the kind of person that she would like me to be, and 
I don’t feel like doing that because I’m a strong, courageous, independent person, and I 
think if I try and go down to meet her, then it will be ok but it will be hard for me because 
I’m not that type of person.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix D – Full list of emergent themes 
 
 
1) Feeling isolated 
 
2) Feeling unheard and misunderstood 
 
3) Self-perception – Unified self-perception – eccentric and perseverant 
 
4) Feeling probed and invaded – having a part of the self taken out of her 
 
5) Firm and unified idea about how one should relate 
 
6) Being-cautious in relationships 
 
7) No reciprocity in relationships 
 
8) Intolerance if ambiguity in terms of rigid self-perception  
 
9) Doubting one’s own worthiness in relationships – bordering on existential self-
doubt 
 
10) Having to prove something – Having to put on a mask 
 
11) Knowing someone completely – What does this mean for Sharon/Adrienne? 
 
12) Feeling that people are unable to empathize – People don’t know where she is 
coming from – more specifically, people who are not mentally ill 
 
13) Difficulty communicating with others 
 
14) Feeling worthy and supported in positive relationships – mostly with other 
mentally ill people who can empathise 
